The Strategic Defence Review and Drone Warfare: Questioning a Dangerous Consensus

While there appears to be a consensus between mainstream political parties, officials and defence commentators that a significant increase in spending on drone and military AI systems would be a positive development, there are serious questions about the basis on which this decision is being made and the likely impact on global security.

New military technology in general, and uncrewed systems in particular, are being presented by politicians and the media as a quick and simple, cost-effective way for the armed forces to increase ‘mass’ and ‘lethality’ without having to procure hugely expensive kit that can take years to produce. Drones are also seen as an alternative to deploying troops in significant numbers at a time when recruitment has become increasingly difficult.

However, far from aiding security, increased spending on drones, autonomous weapons and other emerging military technology will simply lead to a further degrading of UK and global security. Remote and autonomous military systems lower the threshold for the use of armed force, making it much easier for state and non-state groups alike to engage in armed attack. Such systems encourage war as the first rather than the last option.

KEY QUESTIONS

Does the war in Ukraine really demonstrate that ‘drones are the future’?
  • It seems to be taken for granted that the ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated the effectiveness of drone and autonomous warfare and that therefore the UK must ‘learn the lesson’ and increase funding for such technology. However, while drones are being used extensively by both Russia and Ukraine – and causing very substantial numbers of casualties – it is far from clear that they are having any strategic impact.
  • Larger drones such as the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 operated by Ukraine – hailed as the saviour of  Ukraine at the beginning of the war  – and Russia’s Orion MALE armed drone have virtually disappeared above the battlefield as they are easily shot down. Larger one-way attack (sometimes called ‘suicide’) drones are being fired at each other’s major cities by both sides and are causing considerable harm. While these strikes are mainly for propaganda effect, again it is not clear if this will change the outcome of the war.
  • Short range surveillance/attack drones are being used very extensively on the battlefield, and the development in particular of First Person View (FPV) drones to carry out attacks on troops and vehicles has been a significant development. However, counter measures such as electronic jamming means that thousands of these drones are simply lost or crash. In many ways, drone warfare in Ukraine has become a long-term ‘cat and mouse’ fight between drones and counter-drone measures and this is only likely to continue.
Is ‘cutting edge military technology’ a silver bullet for UK Defence?
  • The capabilities of future military systems are frequently overstated and regularly underdelivered. Slick industry videos showcasing new weapons are more often than not the product of graphic designers creative imaginings rather than real world demonstrations of a new capability.
  • Click to open the briefing

    The hype surrounding trials of so-called ‘swarming drones’ is a good example. There is a world of difference between a ‘drone swarm’ in its true, techno-scientific meaning and a group of drones being deployed at the same time. A true drone swarm sees individual systems flying autonomously, communicating with each other and following a set of rules without a central controller. While manufacturers and militaries regularly claim they are testing or trialling ‘a drone swarm’, in reality they just operating a group of drones at the same time controlled by a group of operators.

  • While there have been considerable developments in the field of AI and machine learning over the past decade, the technology is still far from mature. Anyone using a chatbot, for  example, will quickly discover that there can be serious mistakes in the generated output. Trusting data generated by AI systems in a military context, without substantial human oversight and checking, is likely to result in very serious errors. The need for ongoing human oversight of AI systems is likely to render any financial of human resources saving from using AI virtually redundant.
Will funding new autonomous drones actually keep us safe?
  • Perhaps the key question about plans to heavily invest in future military AI and drone warfare is whether it will actually keep the UK safe. Just over a decade ago, armed drones were the preserve of just three states: the US, the UK and Israel. Today, many states and non-state groups are using armed drones to launch remote attacks, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. In essence, as they enable both states and non-state groups to engage in armed attack with little or no risk to themselves, remote and autonomous drones lower the threshold for the use of armed force, making warfare much more likely.
  • Given the global proliferation of such technology, it seems inevitable that any new developments in drone warfare funded by the UK over the next few years will inevitable proliferate and be used by other state and non-state groups. In many ways, it seems only a matter of time before drone warfare comes to the UK.
  • Rather than funding the development of new lethal autonomous drones, the UK should be at the forefront of efforts to curb and control the use of these systems, working with other states, NGOs and international experts to put in place globally accepted rules to control their proliferation and use.
Is the development and use of autonomous weapons inevitable?
  • Although the realm of science fiction until relatively recently, plans are now being developed by a number of states, including the UK, to develop and deploy lethal autonomous weapon systems. It is highly likely that the first fully autonomous weapons will be a drone-based system.
  • The real issue here is not the development of AI itself, but the way it is used. Autonomy raises a wide range of ethical, legal, moral and political issues relating to human judgement, intentions, and responsibilities. These questions remain largely unresolved and there should therefore be deep disquiet about the rapid advance towards developing AI weapons systems.
  • While some argue the inevitability of the development of these systems, there are a range of measures which could be used to prevent their development including establishing international treaties and norms, developing confidence-building measures, introducing international legal instruments, and adopting unilateral control measures. Given how much we have seen drone warfare spread and create global insecurity over the past decade, now is the time for the UK to be fully involved in international discussions to control the development of lethal fully autonomous weapon systems.

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The Next Wave: the emergence of drones at sea

Click to open report

In recent months maritime drones have hit the news headlines as they are increasingly deployed in conflict hot-spots around the world’s seas.  The war in Ukraine, tensions in the ocean around China, and most recently armed attacks on shipping in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea have all been characterised by the use of various types of drones – uncrewed aircraft, drone boats, unpowered marine ‘glider’ craft, and underwater vehicles.

Our new study, ‘The Next Wave’, investigates the development and use of maritime drones and the likely future implications of their use in combat.  While uncrewed boats have long been used in warfare – with the US Navy first using uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) for mine clearance in the 1990’s – today, maritime drones are used by an increasing number of states and non-state groups.  This study reviews the reasons why,  summarizes developments by the major military powers and the UK, and examines a set of case studies to identify how drones have been used during different types of conflict at sea.

Why drones at sea?

Maritime drones are a fraction of the cost of a conventional destroyer or submarine and represent a new vision of naval warfare that exchanges small numbers of high-value military assets for large numbers of cheaper, flexible, and simpler platforms which, working together, have a greater overall capability.  In this vision, platforms can be modular, able to carry a number of payloads such as weapons, sensors, or smaller drones depending on the mission, and work as a connected network using artificial intelligence computing methods to stay in touch with other members of the fleet and with human controllers.  An adversary would be overwhelmed with a multitude of small targets instead of a few large warships.

Drones can gather information about the ocean more cheaply than larger crewed vessels, and may also be able to reach areas that would be inaccessible for a larger ship.  They are not bounded by the physiological limitations of human personnel and can undertake assignments that humans find demanding, such as deep diving or an extended submarine mission.  They are also more easily able to loiter undetected than a larger ship, allowing data to be collected over a longer time period, and can also allow potentially dangerous objects to be examined remotely, reducing risks.

Within the world’s vast oceans, certain locations are particularly strategically important for both military and civilian purposes. These include the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, areas around disputed islands in the South and East China Seas, the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, the Baltic Sea and the English Channel.  These areas often represent choke points and are both crowded with marine traffic and focal points for concentrations of underwater infrastructure.  Drone networks are an attractive option for military planners when undertaking surveillance and reconnaissance operations in such areas.

Military development of maritime drones

The world’s major military powers are all keen to develop drones for use in warfare, recognising the military potential of new technologies, and have all begun research and investment into next-generation weaponry and technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and uncrewed and autonomous systems.  China, Russia and the US and its NATO allies have a highly competitive relationship in these fields, and are actively developing such capabilities, including systems for use in the maritime domain, with Russia lagging somewhat behind China and the US.

Like the larger powers, the UK is keen to exploit the potential of uncrewed and autonomous technology for military purposes.  The Royal Navy sees maritime autonomous systems as a major component of its future fleet, operating on and under the sea and in the air on both front line logistics and support tasks.  To date, the UK has used uncrewed technologies to undertake routine tasks such as survey work and dangerous operations such as minesweeping, and in the longer term it has the aims of automating and roboticising many of the roles of its capital ships and equipping them with uncrewed aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles to contribute to a low cost weaponised sensor network.  The systems currently deployed by the UK are still mainly small scale and / or experimental system and the sums of money involved have been relatively modest. Read more

The UK and the Ukraine War: Drones vs Diplomacy

Custom-built British ‘suicide-drone’ reportedly bound for Ukraine.     Pic: QinetiQ

The UK is to supply Ukraine with “hundreds of new long-range attack drones” a government spokesperson told the media on Monday as the Prime Minister Rishi Sunak welcomed President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to Britain for a brief visit.

“Today the prime minister will confirm the further UK provision of hundreds of air defence missiles and further unmanned aerial systems including hundreds of new long-range attack drones with a range of over 200km. These will all be delivered over the coming months as Ukraine prepares to intensify its resistance to the ongoing Russian invasion.”

It is not at all clear what theses ‘long range attack drones’ are, although there has been some reports of the UK funding the development of a ‘suicide-drone’ to supply to Ukraine.

This latest news comes on top of the announcement in the last few weeks that the UK is supplying Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine following the export of UK Challenger 2 tanks.

Some will no doubt welcome the supply of attack drones and cruise missiles to Ukraine as a counter to Russia’s military aggression. It goes without saying that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continuing use of lethal force is unlawful and must be resisted.   However, there are real questions to be asked now about how such a strategy of supplying evermore lethal military hardware risks expanding rather than ending this war. It is becoming increasingly easier to see the UK and other NATO countries being drawn more directly into an armed conflict with Russia.  Any such escalation would be disastrous for the people of Ukraine and the wider region as well as seriously risking a catastrophic nuclear event.

Rather than escalating the conflict by supplying ever more lethal arms, the UK should be urging negotiations to end the war as it is inevitable that this will have to happen at some point.  While some western military analysts urge that the war should be prolonged in order to weaken Russia in the long term, Ukraine and its people suffer.

Negotiations are of course a matter for the Ukrainian people, but it should be remembered that a settlement  was seemingly very close last March with a Turkish-backed plan for Russian forces to withdraw to their pre-24 February positions without Ukraine giving up its claim to any of its territory.  Unfortunately the moment passed (with suggestions that the then British PM Boris Johnson personally lobbied Zelenskiy to reject the plan (for more on this see  Ukraine One Year On: Time to Negotiate Peace).

While it is easy for the current PM to grab a few headlines and play to the crowd by supplying lethal attack drones to Ukraine, the harder but more rewarding long-term work of diplomacy in order to end this awful war is being neglected.

Ukraine drones may grab all the headlines, but armed drones are enabling lethal force around the globe

President Zelensky stand with a ‘suicide drone’ in Kyiv, Oct 2022

As we reach the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, you could be forgiven for thinking that the on-going conflict in eastern Europe has become the epicentre of the use of drones.

However, while the use of UAVs by Ukrainian and Russian forces has been very significant, it is important to be aware that there are real and important differences between the use of mainly small drone systems by parties in that conflict, and the use of large armed drones by other states such as the US, UK, Israel and Turkey even since the beginning of 2023.

Drones use in the Ukraine war

Over the past year, hardly a report on the war has failed to mention Ukraine’s use of surveillance drones to zero in Ukrainian artillery and rocket attacks on Russian forces or more recently, Russia’s use of Iranian  so called ‘suicide drones’ to attack Ukrainian targets.

Early on in the conflict, Ukraine deployed a number of larger armed Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones.  Media reports at the time lauded the use of these as a game-changer and some even went so far as to suggest that use of armed drones would be strategically significant in the conflict.  However it quickly became apparent that the Bayraktar drones were very vulnerable to air-to-ground missiles as many were shot-down or crashed (see our crash database) and they quickly disappeared from the battlefield.  Some suggest that a few Bayraktars remain hidden and are being used covertly or kept for future operations but it is impossible to verify such claims.

Russia has at least one type of the larger armed medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) drone in its inventory – the Inokhodets or Orion (not to be confused with the much smaller and ubiquitous surveillance drone, the Orlan).  However, like the Bayraktar, the armed drone seems to have disappeared from the skies after one was shot down in April 2022.

Both sides have also occasionally used very old, soviet-era unmanned aircraft such as the Tupolev Strizh or Reys as missiles.

More recently, Russia has also used systems acquired from Iran. These have mainly been the Shahed 131/136 which are  technically loitering munitions that can only be used once, and have gained the moniker of ‘suicide drones’ in the press.  Alongside Russia is known to have acquired Iranian Mohajer-6 armed drones (one was filmed being fished out of the Black Sea after it was shot down/crashed) and, according to US sources, the Shahed 191 /129 armed UAVS, but these have not been seen in use.

Alongside the use of loitering munitions, both sides have primarily used small, short range drones for reconnaissance and  surveillance as well as targeting of artillery and rocket systems. While the use of drones in this way has been very significant – indeed perhaps the most significant use of drones for this purpose in any conflict until now – it is very different to how some states are using armed drones elsewhere.

Armed drone attacks outside of Ukraine virtually ignored

Even since the beginning of 2023, let alone the start of the Ukraine war, there has been significant use of armed drones by the states including the US, Israel and Turkey to conduct unlawful attacks.  These strikes, however, only get a fraction of the amount of media attention that drone use in Ukraine has, and are virtually ignored by the international community.  Read more

Military drone crash update: Ukraine war toll and ‘hidden crashes’

Bayraktar TB2 reportedly shot down near Kursk, April 2022

Updated – see below

We’ve added details of another 21 crashes to our drone crash database for the first half of 2022  – although 14 of them occurred in the context of the on-going war in Ukraine, so many will have likely been shot down.

It’s important to be aware that we only include larger (Class II and Class III) drones in our database, typified by medium altitude/long endurance drones like the Reaper MQ-9 and Bayraktar TB2.   There have been dozens of verified reports of smaller drones being shot down or crashing in that conflict but they are outside the scope of our study. However, it is extremely likely that other large drones have also crashed/been shot down in that conflict but have not been verified.

In addition, as we regularly try to explain, there are many crashes of large drones that simply aren’t made public and so don’t make it into our database. More on this below.

Ukraine

As in any armed conflict, there is a significant amount of disinformation and confusion surrounding on-going events.  We are only including details of large drone crashes that have been verified  – primarily through use of images.  @robLee@UAVTracker and @Oryx have done sterling work detailing on-going events.  Significantly, older Soviet-era reconnaissance drones have also been pressed into service by both sides, with indications that they may be being used as ‘flying missiles’.  One of these flew off course, crossing several European borders before crashing in the Croatian capital, Zagreb.  Both Russia and Ukraine have denied responsibility.  In a similar case, a Ukrainian operated Bayraktar TB2 went off course and ended up crashing off the coast of Romania.

Large UAVs crashed/shot down relating to Russia/Ukraine war (till 30th June)

Date Operator Drone type Details/source Location
Jun 28, 2022 Ukraine Tu-143 Reys Mid-flight (shot down) Russia
May 10, 2022 Russian Tu-141 Strizh Mid-flight (shot down?) Ukraine
May 7, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight Romania
May 1, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down?) Ukraine
Apr 27, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down?) Russia
Apr 27, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down?) Russia
Apr 25, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down?) Russia
Apr 12, 2022 Ukraine Tu-143 Reys Mid-flight (shot down) Ukraine
Apr 7, 2022 Russia Inokhodets (Orion) Mid-flight (shot down?) Ukraine
Apr 2, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down) Ukraine
Mar 30, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down) Ukraine
Mar 17, 2022 Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 Mid-flight (shot down) Ukraine
Mar 11, 2022 Russia Forpost Mid-flight (shot down?) Ukraine
Mar 10, 2022 ? Tu-141 Strizh Mid-flight Croatia

Elsewhere, during the first six months of 2022, large drones operated by the US, India, France, Saudi Arabia and Philippines air forces have crashed or been shot down.  The variety of operators and types of UAVs crashing gives an indication of how difficult it is to operate these systems.  Remotely controlling aircraft is incredibly complex and a huge variety of problems can arise leading to an abrupt termination of the flight, including  mechanical issue, electrical failure, lost-communication link, weather problems and human error.  Read more

Loitering munitions, the Ukraine war, and the drift towards ‘killer robots’.

Switchblade loitering munition flies towards target area. The operator views video feed and then designates which  target the munition should strike.

Loitering munitions are now hitting the headlines in the media as a result of their use in the Ukraine war.  Vivid descriptions of ‘kamikaze drones’ and ‘suicide drones’ outline the way in which these weapons operate: they are able to find targets and fly towards them before crashing into them and exploding.  Both Russia and Ukraine are deploying loitering munitions, which allow soldiers to fire on targets such as tanks and heavy armour without the predictability of a mortar or artillery round firing on a set trajectory.   Under some circumstances these ‘fire and forget’ weapons may be able operate with a high degree of autonomy.  For example they can programmed to fly around autonomously in a defined search area and highlight possible targets such as tanks to the operator.  In these circumstances they can be independent of human control. This trend towards increasing autonomy in weapons systems raising questions about how they might shape the future of warfare and the morality of their use.

Loitering munitions such as these have previously been used to military effect in Syria and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.  Although they are often described as drones, they are in many ways more like a smart missile than an uncrewed aircraft.  Loitering munitions were first developed in the 1980s and can be thought of as a ‘halfway house’ between drones and cruise missiles.  They differ from drones in that they are expendable, and unlike cruise missiles, have the ability to loiter passively in the target area and search for a target.  Potential targets are identified using radar, thermal imaging, or visual sensor data and, to date, a human operator selects the target and executes the command to destroy the target.  They are disposable, one-time use weapons intended to hunt for a target and then destroy it, hence their tag as ‘kamikaze’ weapons.  Dominic Cummings, former chief advisor to the Prime Minister describes a loitering munition as a “drone version of the AK-47: a cheap anonymous suicide drone that flies to the target and blows itself up – it’s so cheap you don’t care”.  Read more