Author: Chris Cole

Developments on both sides of the Atlantic signal push to develop AI attack drones

Developments on both sides of the Atlantic signal push to develop AI attack drones

Chris Cole
Artist impression of crewed aircraft operating with autonomous drones. Credit: Lockheed Martin

Recent government and industry announcements signal clear intent by both the US and the UK to press ahead with the development of a new generation of AI attack drones despite serious concerns about the development of autonomous weapons. While most details are being kept secret, it is clear from official statements, industry manoeuvring and budget commitments that these new drones are expected to be operational by the end of the decade.

The current focus is the development of drones that were previously labelled as ‘loyal wingman’ but are now being described either as ‘Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) or ‘Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (ACP).  As always, the nomenclature around ‘drones’ is a battlefield itself.  The concept for this type of drone is for one or more to fly alongside, or in the vicinity of, a piloted military aircraft with the drones carrying out specifically designated tasks such as surveillance, electronic warfare, guiding weapons onto targets, or carrying out air-to-air or air-to-ground strikes.  Rather than being directly controlled by individual on the ground such as current armed drones like the Reaper or Bayraktar, these drones will fly autonomously. According to DARPA officials (using the beloved sports metaphor) these drone will allow pilots to direct squads of unmanned aircraft “like a football coach who chooses team members and then positions them on the field to run plays.”

Next Generation

In May, the US Air Force issued a formal request for US defence companies to bid to build a new piloted aircraft to replace the F-22.  However, equally important for the ‘Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD)’ program is the development of new autonomous drones and a ‘combat cloud’ communication network.  While the development of the drones is a covert programme, US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said they will be built “in parallel” to the piloted aircraft. Kendall publicly stated that the competition to develop CCA was expected to begin in Fiscal Year 2024 (note this runs from Oct 2023 to Sept 2024).

While it is planning to build around 200 of the new crewed aircraft, Kendall told reporters that the USAF is expecting to build around 1,000 of the drones. “This figure was derived from an assumed two CCAs per 200 NGAD platforms and an additional two for each of 300 F-35s for a total of 1,000,” Kendall explained. Others expect even more of these drones to be built.  While the NGAD fighter aircraft itself is not expected to be operational until the 2030s, CCA’s are expected to be deployed by the end of the 2020’s.

It’s important to be aware that there will not be one type of drone built under this programme, but a range with different capabilities able to carry out different tasks.  Some of them will be ‘expendable’ – that is designed for just one mission – something like the ‘one-way attack’ drones that we have seen increasing used in Ukraine and elsewhere; some will be ‘attritable’, that is designed that if they are lost in combat it would not be severely damaging, while others, described as ‘exquisite’ will be more capable and specifically designed not to be lost during combat.  A number of companies have set out their proposals, with some even building prototypes and undertaking test flights. Read more →

Online Webinar: ‘Scotland Says Keep Space for Peace’ Tues 19th September, 7pm

Chris Cole


Over the past decade, both the US and UK governments have designated space as a key focus as military operations increasingly rely on space-based assets for command and control, surveillance, targeting, missile warning and secure communications with forces deployed overseas.

In 2019 the Ministry of Defence (MoD) declared that space should be seen as “a war fighting domain” and over the past two years we have seen the setting up of UK Space Command, the publication of a UK Defence Space Strategy outlining how the MoD will “protect the UK’s national interests in space” and the announcement of a portfolio of new military programmes to develop space-based military assets. Incredibly, both the US and UK are also exploring the use of nuclear propulsion for their space systems.

The UK is now in the process of developing a number of UK spaceports – including in Shetland, the Western Isles and Sutherland – from where we will see both commercial and military space launches. We are entering an era of military space expansion by the UK which will inevitably lead to environmental harm and risk of instability and conflict.

Join Scottish CND and Space Watch UK/Drone Wars to examine how new Scottish spaceports are at the heart of UK government plans to militarise space and what we can do to challenge it.

We will follow up this online event with an in-person protest outside Scottish Parliament on Tuesday 3rd

Speakers:

• Dr Jill Stuart is an academic based at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is an expert in the politics, ethics and law of outer space exploration and exploitation. She is a frequent presence in the global media on the issue and regularly gives lectures around the world.

• Dave Webb is former Chair of CND, Convenor of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space and co-author of the new report ‘Heavens Above: Examining the UK’s Militarisation of Space.

• George Gunn grew up in the far north of Scotland and now lives in Thurso. He is a poet and has written over fifty productions for stage and radio and has produced several series for BBC Radio Scotland and Radio 4. He has a regular column ‘From the Province of the Cat’ in Bella Caledonia.

• Timothy Parker a recent graduate of the University of Reading, researched the development of UK spaceports and the implications of AI for the UK’s nuclear weapons programme as part of an internship for Drone Wars UK.

• Tor Justad is Chair of Highlands Against Nuclear Transport (HANT). He believes in the words of Margaret Mead: “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.”

Chair:

• Lynn Jamieson is an academic and Chair of Scottish CND.

 

Tickets for the webinar are free and can be booked at the Eventbrite page here.

 

 

US military drones set to fly from UK from 2024

Chris Cole
Top: US RQ-4 Global Hawk, bottom: US MQ-9 Reaper

The US Air Force (USAF) has applied to the UK’s air regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to change airspace rules to allow RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper drones to fly from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire.

The application for Global Hawk flights envisages them beginning in 2024.  A recent update of the Reaper application states that while “the USAFE requirement for MALE RPAS at RAF Fairford remains” it is temporarily pausing the process while it reassesses how to comply with the current regulatory framework.  While nominally described as an ‘RAF’ base, Fairford is wholly operated by the US Air Force.

Currently, drones that fly beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) are not allowed to fly in the UK unless in segregated airspace. The USAF, through the Ministry of Defence (MoD), is seeking to put in place segregated corridors to allow these drones to transit through UK airspace.  The RAF is currently going through the same process to enable it to fly the UK’s new ‘Protector’ armed drones from RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire.  The USAF may be awaiting the CAA’s decision in this case (due very soon) before proceeding with its application to fly Reaper drones.

According to one document submitted to the CAA, the “working assumption” by the USAF is that the corridors would be activated 2-3 times per week but they are “exploring activation periods that exceed these assumption, both in frequency and time periods of utilisation.”  The proposal is that the drones would take off and land overnight: “all activations will be between 1 hour after sunset and 1 hour before sunrise unless in extremis.”

Lack of oversight

If this change is agreed there will be very little chance of the public  knowing when or where these US drones will be used operationally.  While the government has said previously that combat operations from US bases in the UK are subject to “joint decision” in reality the government has little say or control over operations from US bases as the framework under which they operate  – the 1951 Status of Forces Agreement – gives jurisdiction to the US, not the UK.

This is a very significant move.  While the war in Ukraine will no doubt be at the forefront of people’s thinking in regard to this development, the US uses drones – surveillance and armed – to enable it undertake air strikes right across the globe, both in areas of armed conflict, but also beyond for so-called ‘targeted killings’. The UN, many individual states and international law experts have condemned the use of drones for these unlawful operations describing them as extrajudicial killings which undermine global peace and security.  Read more →

Small drones, big problem. Two new reports examine the rise and rise of armed ‘one-way attack’ drones 

Chris Cole
From top: Israeli Harop, Iranian Shaded 136, Polish Warmate.

Over the past few years  – and particularly in the on-going war in Ukraine – we have seen the rise in use of what has become known as ‘kamikaze’ or  ‘suicide’ drones.  Two new excellent reports have just been released which examine these systems.  ‘One-Way Attack Drones: Loitering Munitions of the Past and Present’ written by Dan Gettinger, formerly of the Bard Drone Center and ‘Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability’ by Ingvild Bode & Tom Watts,  examine between them the history, current use, and growing concern about the increasing autonomy of such systems.

A drone by any other name…?

Firstly, to address the elephant in the room: are these systems ‘drones’?

Naming has always been a keenly fought aspect of the debate about drones, with sometimes bitter conflict over whether such platforms should be named ‘unmanned aerial vehicles’ (UAVS), ‘remotely piloted air systems’ (RPAS) or ‘drones’. ‘Drones’ has been the term that has stuck, particularly in mainstream media, but is regularly used interchangeably with UAV (with ‘unmanned’ being replaced in recent years by ‘uncrewed’ for obvious reasons).  While many in the military now accept the term ‘drone’ and are happy to use it depending on the audience, some continue to insist that it belittles both capabilities of the system and those who operate them.

Whichever term is used, a further aspect of the naming debate is that an increasing number and type of military aerial systems are being labelled as ‘drones’.  While all these systems have significant characteristics in common (aerial systems, unoccupied, used for surveillance/intelligence gathering and/or attack), they can also be very different in terms of size and range; can carry out very different missions; have different effects; and raise different legal and ethical issues.

One type of such system is the so-called ‘suicide’ or ‘kamikaze’ drone  – perhaps better labelled ‘one way attack’ drone.  There are several different categories of this type of drone, and while they are are used to carry out remote lethal attacks and therefore have significant aspects in common with the much larger Reaper or Bayraktar drones, they are significantly different in that they are not designed to be re-used, but rather are expendable as the warhead is part of the structure of the system which is destroyed in use. Importantly, while loitering munitions are a sub-set of ‘one way attack’ drones, not all one-way attack drones are loitering munitions.

Dan Gettinger’s report ‘One-Way Attack Drones: Loitering Munitions of the Past and Present’ helpfully sets out a history of the development of these systems and identifies three sub categories: anti-radar systems, portable or ‘backpackable’ systems and Iranian systems.  He has compiled a helpful dataset of over 200 such systems (although not all are currently in operation). All of these, he argues, can be traced back to “the transition from the era of jet-powered target drones to that of remotely piloted vehicles.” Read more →

Tribunal upholds MoD refusal to disclose details of UK Reaper drone missions outside of Op Shader

Chris Cole
Click to read Decision Notice

Fifteen months after hearing our appeal, an Information Tribunal handed down its decision this week rejecting our arguments that basic details about the deployment of armed Reaper drones outside of Operation Shader (Iraq/Syria) by the UK needed to be released to enable public and parliamentary oversight over such deployments.

Both Clive Lewis MP and Baroness Vivienne Stern, Vice-Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Drones and Modern Conflict had submitted statements to the Tribunal supporting our appeal.  Clive Lewis argued that  the refusal to answer these questions about the deployment of Reaper is “a serious backward step in terms of transparency and accountability.”   Baroness Stern stated:

“Despite repeated attempts by myself and colleagues to attain even the most basic information about the UK’s drone deployments, policy, and commitments, Parliament has not been provided with the accurate and timely information needed to meaningfully carry out its constitutional scrutiny role. Whilst certain details must be kept secret in order to ensure operational and national security, the current trend of withholding information about the use of drones purely because it is seen as an “intelligence” asset, as well as withholding vital information on the UK’s growing military capabilities and commitments is deeply concerning and unjustified.”

While insisting that it was neither confirming nor denying the deployment, the MoD argued against the release of the information on three broad grounds . As the Decision Notice states:

“the MOD’s key concern about the release of the requested information was that it could lead an adversary to infer the absence or presence of UK personnel. In his [The MoD’s witness’] opinion were the locations to be released or inferred from a combination of requested data and already published material (the “mosaic effect”), there would be an elevated risk to any potential personnel in that location and an increased risk of hostile acts against them.”

A second concern was

“there would be an increased risk to any nation hosting the Reaper operations as an adversary may target a hostile act at the host nation rather than the UK which may be a more difficult target. Thereby undermining the UK’s relationship with that nation and undermining military operations conducted from that location.”

Finally, and most concerning from a scrutiny and oversight point of view the MoD argued (again quoting Decision Notice)

“The effectiveness of operations conducted using Reaper outside Operation Shader in future depend, in part, on a greater degree of ambiguity as to the employment of Reaper in order to be successful. It is important to retain a degree of ambiguity regarding the full extent of Reaper operations now in order to maintain this flexibility in the future. “

Drone Wars argued strongly that the information requested –  a single figure of the number of sorties undertaken outside of Operation Shader and their broad, geographic location (i.e. ‘The Middle East’) – was not capable of causing the prejudice alleged.  We also pointed out to the Tribunal that the MoD has previously released the number of sorties undertaken outside of Operation Shader (In response to our questions about the targeted killing of Naweed Hussain in 2018) without any of the prejudice or harm suggested, but that seems to have been ignored by the tribunal.  Read more →

The UK and the Ukraine War: Drones vs Diplomacy

Chris Cole
Custom-built British ‘suicide-drone’ reportedly bound for Ukraine.     Pic: QinetiQ

The UK is to supply Ukraine with “hundreds of new long-range attack drones” a government spokesperson told the media on Monday as the Prime Minister Rishi Sunak welcomed President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to Britain for a brief visit.

“Today the prime minister will confirm the further UK provision of hundreds of air defence missiles and further unmanned aerial systems including hundreds of new long-range attack drones with a range of over 200km. These will all be delivered over the coming months as Ukraine prepares to intensify its resistance to the ongoing Russian invasion.”

It is not at all clear what theses ‘long range attack drones’ are, although there has been some reports of the UK funding the development of a ‘suicide-drone’ to supply to Ukraine.

This latest news comes on top of the announcement in the last few weeks that the UK is supplying Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine following the export of UK Challenger 2 tanks.

Some will no doubt welcome the supply of attack drones and cruise missiles to Ukraine as a counter to Russia’s military aggression. It goes without saying that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continuing use of lethal force is unlawful and must be resisted.   However, there are real questions to be asked now about how such a strategy of supplying evermore lethal military hardware risks expanding rather than ending this war. It is becoming increasingly easier to see the UK and other NATO countries being drawn more directly into an armed conflict with Russia.  Any such escalation would be disastrous for the people of Ukraine and the wider region as well as seriously risking a catastrophic nuclear event.

Rather than escalating the conflict by supplying ever more lethal arms, the UK should be urging negotiations to end the war as it is inevitable that this will have to happen at some point.  While some western military analysts urge that the war should be prolonged in order to weaken Russia in the long term, Ukraine and its people suffer.

Negotiations are of course a matter for the Ukrainian people, but it should be remembered that a settlement  was seemingly very close last March with a Turkish-backed plan for Russian forces to withdraw to their pre-24 February positions without Ukraine giving up its claim to any of its territory.  Unfortunately the moment passed (with suggestions that the then British PM Boris Johnson personally lobbied Zelenskiy to reject the plan (for more on this see  Ukraine One Year On: Time to Negotiate Peace).

While it is easy for the current PM to grab a few headlines and play to the crowd by supplying lethal attack drones to Ukraine, the harder but more rewarding long-term work of diplomacy in order to end this awful war is being neglected.