The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare – Richard Falk

Professor Richard Falk

Richard Falk is an international law and international relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for forty years.  In his recent article The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare, he places the growing use of drones in their historical and political context.  The full article is highly recommended reading.  Here we excerpt the final paragraphs, reproduced with his kind permission.

 

The U.S. reliance on attack drones to engage in targeted killing, especially in third countries (Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan) has raised controversial international law issues of sovereign rights in interaction with lethal acts of war, especially those far removed from the zone of live combat. The increasing reliance on drones during the Obama presidency has produced unintended deaths, civilians in the vicinity of the target and attacks directed at the wrong personnel, as with the NATO helicopter attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers who had been deployed near the Afghan border on November 25, 2011, provoking a major international incident (although not a drone attack, it was linked by angered Pakistani officials to similar mis-targeting by drones). There are also unconfirmed reports of drone follow up raids at sites of targeted killing that seem directed at those who mount rescue operations or arrange funerals for prior victims. As with the Bush torture debate the political leadership in Washington has turned for justifications to government lawyers who have responded by developing drone legal briefs that seem somewhat analogous to the notorious Yoo ‘torture memos.’ There are, however, some differences in the two contexts that work against equating the two controversies about post-9/11 war making.

For one thing, torture has a long history, having been practiced by governments for centuries, and its relatively recent prohibition is embedded in a clear norm criminalizing torture that is contained in the International Torture Convention of 1984. Torture is also enumerated as one of the Crimes Against Humanity in the statute of the International Criminal Court. Drone technology adapted to serve as a battlefield weapon is, in contrast, of extremely recent origin. Nothing in international law exists that is comparably specific with respect to drone attacks to the legal repudiation of torture. There is some resemblance between efforts by Obama law officials to stretch the conception of self-defense beyond previously understood limits to justify targeted killing and the Bush lawyers who claimed that water boarding was not torture. Expanding the prior understanding of the legal right of self-defense represents a self-serving reinterpretation of this core international legal norm by the U.S. Government. It seems opportunistic and unpersuasive and seems unlikely to be generally accepted as a reframing of the right of self-defense under international law.

Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do with future implications. Although there are some loopholes involving extraordinary rendition and secret CIA operated overseas black sites, torture has been credibly prohibited by President Obama. Beyond this, the repudiation of torture has been understood in a manner that conforms to the general international consensus rather than the narrowed conception insisted upon by the Bush-era legalists. In contrast, drones seem destined to be central to operational planning for future military undertakings of the United States, with sharply escalating appropriations to support both the purchase of increasing numbers and varieties of drone. The government is  engaging in a major research program designed to make drones available for an expanding range of military missions and to serve as the foundation of a revolutionary transformation of the way America will fight future wars. Some of these revolutionary features are already evident: casualty-free military missions; subversion of territorial sovereignty; absence of transparency and accountability; further weakening of political constraints on recourse to war.

Future war scenarios involve attacks by drones swarms, interactive squadrons of drones re-targeting while in a combat zone without human participation, and covert attacks using mini-drones. A further serious concern is the almost certain access to drone technology by private sectors actors. These musings are not science fiction, but well financed undertakings at  or beyond the development stage. It is in these settings especially, where the analogy to nuclear weapons seems most pertinent, and discouraging. Given the amount invested and the anticipated profitability and utility of drones, it may already be too late to interrupt their development, deployment, and expanding sphere of use. Unlike nuclear weaponry, already some 50 countries reportedly possess drones, mainly adapted to surveillance. As with nuclear weaponry, the United States, and other leading political actors, will not agree to comprehensive prohibitions on the use of drones for lethal purposes.

If this line of reasoning is generally correct, there are two likely futures for attack drones: an unregulated dispersion of the weaponry to public and private actors with likely strategic roles undermining traditional international law limits on war making and public order; or a new non-proliferation regime for drones that permits all states to possess and use surveillance drones within sovereign space and allows some states to make discretionary use of drones globally and for attack purposes until a set on constraining regulations can be agreed upon by a list of designated states. That is, drone military technology will perpetuate the two-tier concept of world order that has taken shape in relation to nuclear weapons, and reflects the consensus that both nuclear disarmament and unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weaponry are unacceptable. In this regard, a counter-proliferation regime for drones is a lesser evil, but still an evil.

The technological momentum that has built up in relation to drones is probably too strong to be challenged politically. The military applications are too attractive, the technology is of a cutting edge fantasy quality, the political appeal of war fighting that involves minimum human risk is too great. At the same time, for much of the world this kind of unfolding future delivers a somber message of a terrifying unfolding vulnerability. At present, there seems to be no way to insulate societies from either intrusive and perpetual surveillance or the prospect of targeted killing and devastation conducted from a remote location. It may be contended that such an indictment of drones exaggerates their novelty. Has not the world lived for decades with weapons of mass destruction possessed by a small number of non-accountable governments and deliverable anywhere on the planet in a matter of minutes? This is superficially true, and frightening enough, but the catastrophic quality of nuclear weaponry and its release of atmospheric radioactivity operates as an inhibitor of uncertain reliability, while with drone their comparative inexpensiveness and non-apocalyptic character makes it much easier to drift mindlessly until an unanticipated day of reckoning occurs by which time all possibilities of control will have been long lost.

 As with nuclear weaponry, climate change, and respect for the carrying capacity of the earth, we who are alive at present may be the last who have even the possibility of upholding the life prospects of future generations. It seems late, but still not too late to act responsibly, but we will not be able to make such claims very much longer. Part of the challenge is undoubtedly structural. For most purposes, global governance depends on cooperation among sovereign states, but in matters of war and peace the world order system remains resolutely vertical and under the control of geopolitical actors, perhaps as few as one, who are unwilling to restrict their military activities to the confines of territorial boundaries, but insist on their prerogative to manage coercively the planet as a whole. When it comes to drones the fate of humanity is squeezed between the impotence of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.

Obama admits drone strikes in Pakistan as US drone strikes Yemen


For the first time, the United States has confirmed that it is undertaking drone strikes in Pakistan.

Many may feel that this has long been an open secret as unnamed officials regularly take to the press about CIA drone strikes. However the admition by President Obama during a ‘Google online hangout’ will no doubt have legal and political implications. In september 2011 a Federal Judge dismissed an ACLU lawsuit seeking information about CIA drone strikes in Pakistan as the CIA would not confirm or deny the drone strikes took place.

Meanwhile a US drone strike killed between 12 and 15 people in Yemen overnight according to Reuters.

Industry lobbying to change drone export control rules

The main international agreement controlling  the proliferation of drones, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), is coming under increasing pressure from drone manufacturers who see it as out-dated and ‘a drag’ on the development of their industry.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a non-binding voluntary agreement between a number of countries who have agreed to curb the spread of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.   The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, but has since grown to a total of  thirty-four.

The MTCR controls two categories of delivery systems and applicable technology.  Category One systems are capable of delivering a 500 kilogram warhead further than 300 kilometres, while Category II covers systems that carry a lighter warhead or have a range of less than 300km.   Although all decisions are taken on a national basis, and there is no sanction by other countries if the MTCR is broken, there is a “strong presumption of denial” underpinning Category One – that is, an assumption that MTCR signatory states will not export such systems.  Countries have greater discretion about exporting Category Two systems.

Although the primary focus of the agreement was to control  the spread of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (or drones as they are commonly known) were included as they too can deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Now however, with the rapid development in the use of drones , the MTCR’s control over the export of drones is seen as an obstacle by the drone industry.  Wes Bush, CEO of US drone manufacturer  Northrop Grumman, is one  senior military industry figures who has publicly spoken out against the MTCR saying that that controls  “hurt industry” and the agreement “needs an overhaul”. 

One way that drone manufacturers have already begun to get around the controls is to make small changes to their drones to make them come under Category Two rather than Category One.   In March this year the US government cleared an unarmed version of the Predator drone for export after changes were made so it would come under MTCR Category Two rather than Category  One,  and then in May it was revealed that the Israeli manufactured ‘Dominator 2’ had also been cleared for export after changes had been made to its basic design.   Israel is not officially an  MTCR country but states that it agrees to abide by the MTCR controls.

Another suggestion for getting round the agreement made in a recent US forum on the matter is that the industry provide drone “services” to other nations rather than selling them the actual  drones, “a move which would bypass MTCR restrictions because the UAV would remain under [the selling countries] control.”  While this may sound unworkable, it should be remembered that Israel is renting its Hermes drone to the UK for use in Afghanistan on a ‘pay by the hour’ basis in a very similar way to this suggestion.

There is little publicly available information about the internal working of the MTCR as much of what happens takes place behind closed doors.  The most recent Plenary Meeting of MTCR countries took place in April 2011 in Argentina where discussion about the impact of the MTCR on the growth of the drone market clearly took place as this International Institute for Strategic Studies briefing, written before the meeting, makes clear:

“Several MTCR member states, and their defence aerospace industries, have an interest in considering how the regime addresses medium- and high-altitude long-endurance (MALE/HALE) UAVs. With domestic defence budgets coming under pressure, there is renewed impetus in identifying additional export markets for these types of UAVs, including commercial and paramilitary applications. The present MTCR guidelines are a hindrance and complicate their sale.”

While the bland statement issued at the end of the meeting made no mention of these ‘rumblings’ (as the ISS called them), it is clear that pressure is continuing to be applied behind the scenes.

Aviation Week quoted an (unnamed) CEO of one UAV company talking about the issue: “People will say ‘You’re only doing this because you want to sell more UAVs’, and that’s exactly what we want to do.”

We shall be monitoring industry lobbying on this issue.  If anyone has any info to share we shall be delighted to receive it.

Deaths of UK nationals in US drone strikes must be investigated

Another two British men have reportedly been killed in US drone strikes.  Ibrahim Adam (24) and Mohammed Azmir Khan (38) were said by their families to have been killed in separate drone strikes  up to three months ago.  While reports vary, the Guardian says that Ibrahim Adam was struck while riding a motorcycle and Mohammed Azimir Khan was  killed in a strike two weeks later.

Previous British victims of US drone strikes include Mohammed Azimir Khan’s younger brother, Abdul Jabbar, who  was killed in a drone strike in October last year as we reported here.  Then in December 2010 a further two other British men, named locally as Mr Stephen and Mr Dearsmith, were killed in drone strike in North Waziristan.  Rashid Rauf was reported killed in a drone strike in 2006.

Ibrahim Adam had been the subject of a control order here in the UK before fleeing in May 2007 while Mohammed Azmir Khan had his assets frozen in February 2010 as he had been ‘suspected’ (but not charged) of being involved in fundraising for terrorism.  He has since been removed from the  Treasury’s list of people and organisations subject to financial sanctions.

In total it appears that six British nationals have been killed in US drone strikes in Pakistan.  While the Foreign Office has said in the past that it was “looking into the reports” of the killings, so far none of these violent deaths have been investigated by UK authorities as they have a duty to do.  At the very least a coroner inquest should be held to uncover the circumstances surrounding these latest killings.

The Real Drone Virus

Since Wired announced last week that a computer virus has infected the Ground Control stations of the USAF Reaper and Predator drone fleet at Creech Air Force Base, the blogosphere as well as the general media  have been awash with the story.

While many commentators have jokingly refered to the Terminator movies, the reality is that the virus isn’t that serious.  While it is worrying that a so-called secure network controlling lethal weapons can become infected with a computer virus (and one that is apparently resisting attempts to delete it) it is seemingly a fairly common piece of malware that records keystrokes.

Much more serious is the ‘drone virus’ that has infected the body politic. Created in military labs by scientists looking for the quick, easy and profitable cure for the world’s security problems, the drone is now spreading virus-like around the world. Before the drone virus spread, the idea that nations could simply, publicly and illegally assassinate individuals and their families without causing outrage would have seemed incredible.  Now we have been infected, the military can ‘take out’ targets of opportunity thousands of miles away before heading home for dinner with the kids.  Now we have been contaminated by the drone virus, Presidents can command the killing of citizens without any charges being filed or indeed any due legal process.  This is the real drone virus and we must find a way to cure ourselves.

Th press too has become infected with the drone virus.  With little exception the vast majority of the media has lauded President Obama for the drone assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan in Yemen on 30September.   Before any charges have been filed and without any chance to defend himself al-Awlaki was sentenced to death by US official and “senior lawyers from across the administration” following the drafting of a secret memo.

What criticism there has been in the mainstream media has focused on the fact that al-Awlaki was an American citizen (seemingly it is not so much of a problem to assassinate non-Americans) or the fact that other nations may also now think the have the right to assassinate people with drones.

Perhaps this piece, entitled ‘Drones and the Law’ from the Economist  typifies the response.  Mildly chastising Obama by arguing that drone assassinations should be carried out by the armed forces not the CIA – and suggesting that perhaps there could be secret court hearings to give the appearance of due process –  the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan is nevertheless described as “legitimate self defence”.

A notable exception to the supportive remarks of the drone virus infected press is a piece by Andreas Whittam Smith in the Independent.   Whittam Smith seems to be immune to the drone virus.  In the end, he says,  the killing of al-Awlaki was murder.   He is right.

Liam Fox on Drone Strikes: Our Response

We have recently been forwarded a number of replies from the MoD in response to letters about the use of armed drones.  This letter from Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox – asserting that the UK completely complies with international law and that any civilian casualties are to be regretted – is typical of such replies  (click image left to see full letter).  Behind the bland assurances however serious questions remain.  Here’s our response to Dr Fox’s letter:

Dr Fox:  “ I am not aware of a statement … (attributed by your constituents to the Prime Minister in December 2010 about the numbers of insurgents killed by Reaper RPAS strikes in Afghanistan) nor am I able to provide information on the circumstances in which insurgents have been killed, or their identities.  Such information could be used by enemy forces ….”   

The MoD initially confirmed a figure of ‘more than 124 insurgents killed’ that David Cameron apparently gave in an off-the cuff statement whilst in Afghanistan last December, but they have recently backtracked and begun to deny the PM made any such statement.

Dr Fox argues that because information about the circumstances of the use of British drones “could” be useful to enemy forces he refuses  to release any information whatsoever about the circumstances of the strikes.   We would argue that any potential risk that the information could be helpful to the enemy needs to be balanced against the valid public interest  in understanding how this controversial weapon system is being used.

We believe that some broad information about the 180+ times that British drones have been used in armed strikes could be  safely released.  Indeed, international law, requires a level of public accountability about military operations.   When complete secrecy prevails, as is the case with  UK drones strikes, there is simply no public accountability.

Dr Fox:  “I can  confirm that since July 2008 there has been one incident involving UK Reaper where  there were six civilian casualties.”

Despite admitting that there have been civilian casualties from  British drone strikes,  it is far from certain  whether the incident described is the only time that civilians have been  killed.  Indeed doubt remains about the casualty figures given by the MoD in the above incident.

Firstly a complaint about the lack of clarity about the release of the casualty figures in relation to this attack was upheld by an internal MoD review.  More detailed and accurate figures  – four civilians killed and two injured –  were available but not given.  Instead the less informative and more general figure of ‘six  civilian casualties’ was released.    Dr Fox again gives the less accurate figure in his letter.

Secondly, the drone strike occurred on March  25th in the Now Zad district of Helmand province.   Local Afghan official in Helmand province said at the time that  two men, two women, and three children were killed and another three children and two adults wounded in the strike.

Finally it is important to remember that casualties designated as ‘insurgents’ by British and NATO forces in Afghanistan may in fact be civilians.

Dr Fox:  “UK forces operate in accordance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also known as the Law of Armed Conflict and UK Rules of  Engagement (ROE). The selection and  prosecution  of all ISAF targets is based on a rigorous scrutiny process that is compliant  with IHL.”

While this sounds very clear, the reality is that international  lawyers, human rights experts and legal scholars are far from clear about who may be targeted in a conflict against non-state actors  like the Taleban or Al-Qaeda.  International law is clear that a distinction must be made between ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’  but under international law ‘combatants’ generally means members of a state’s  armed forces.  The UK is not engaged in a  conflict with the Afghanistan armed forces – indeed we are their allies.

It is argued that civilians who directly participate in hostilities lose the protection that international law provides as long as the are directly participating in hostilities.  Others  have suggested that civilians who have a ‘continuous combatant function’ may be targeted, but again there are serious differences of opinion about this amongst hi-level legal experts.

The use of armed drones for targeted killing away from the battlefield – where targets may not be directly participating in hostilities – has increased the need for clarity about targeting under international law.  In such circumstances, ambiguity about what constitutes direct participation’ is not a theoretical debate; it puts individuals in a  precarious situation of being unable to predict what conduct will make them targetable.  As Christopher Rogers of the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) has noted ( in relation to drone strikes in Pakistan but could equally apply to British drone  strikes in Afghanistan):

Residents of areas in which drones operate do not know what kind  of conduct or relationships could put them at risk. Offering indirect support  to militants such as food or quarter or political or ideological support would not formally qualify under international norms as “direct participation in hostilities.” However, it is entirely possible that the US  considers many people to be combatants, owing  to their relationships to known militants, when they are legally civilians.”

We have asked the MoD several times if  they will confirm that ‘insurgents’ killed by drones were directly participating  in hostilities.  They continue to refuse  to answer.

Dr Fox:  “In respect of  autonomy… the technical challenge is such that the MOD believes that an enduring need for a human component will remain for the foreseeable future.”

While the MoD believe that a  human  will continue to be in the loop  when it comes to launching weapons from unmanned aircraft for ‘the foreseeable future’  (how long is that exactly?) military companies such as BAE Systems continue  to work on developing autonomous weapons systems.  Time and time again we have seen that once  weapon systems are developed they are pressed into service.  The possibility of autonomous unmanned armed  systems is a frightening prospect and we would like to see a firmer rejection of  the development of such a weapon  system from  the UK government.