Will UK learn the dreadful lessons of the Minab school bombing as it presses ahead with AI targeting?

On February 28 2026, the US and Israel launched an unprovoked attack on Iran with more than 1,000 targets hit by bombers and cruise missiles in the first 24 hours. Within hours of the first strike there were media reports that a primary school in Minab, southern Iran, had been hit with reports of significant number of causalities including children.

The destroyed school in Minab, southern Iran. Credit: BBC

In fact at least 157 people were killed in the US Tomahawk missiles strike on the Shajara Tayyiba school, the vast majority of them children (more than 100 under the age of 12) with more than 100 others also injured (see Airwars detailed report). In March, the Pentagon announced that it was undertaking an official investigation into the strike but more than six months later, no report has been forthcoming.

This week, however, a detailed investigation by Bloomberg News, written by Ben Bartenstein and Krishna Karra, was published, with anonymous contributions from US officials said to be involved in the Pentagon investigation. While the official report is still to be released, its clear that there are serious lessons here for those advocating the increased use of AI to speed up targeting.

Epic Fury Foolishness

Following Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 and a build up of US forces in the region, from early 2026 Israel began lobbying the US to launch airstrikes on Iran aimed at so-called regime change, with senior Iranian leaders being key targets. Nationwide protest in late December and early January in Iran had been met with ruthless force by Iranian security, with reports of thousands killed. Trump told Iranians he would ‘make Iran great again’.

Due to the involvement of IRGC naval units in the dispute around the Straits of Hormuz, it is highly likely that Iranian naval facilities were also among the hundreds of targets fed into the Maven Smart System (MSS) – the Palantir-developed US AI-enabled targeting and battlefield management system – for strikes on the first day.

Maven uses AI and machine learning tools (such as Claude) to rapidly process data and ‘support’ commanders. It combines satellite imagery, drone feeds, signals intelligence and a myriad of other information into a single interface, then generates targets and recommends weapons systems.  According to Military Times, it also drafts automated legal justifications for each strike.

Epic Fury, the Pentagon name for the campaign, was the first major AI-driven war according to Palantir’s Chief Technology Officer, Shyam Sankar:

“People will reflect back and say this is the first large-scale combat operation that was really driven, enhanced and made substantially more productive with technology, with AI.”

Blame Game

The Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab was on the edge of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval medical facility.  While the school building and grounds had once formed part of the military facility, it had been walled off at least nine years before the strike, and according to satellite images, had brightly painted walls and school sports facilities visible clearly visible.

Credit: Planet Labs/BBC

Almost immediately after the strike, commentators began to ponder whether the use of AI to rapidly develop such large number of targets contributed to the deaths. However, equally quickly, advocates of the use of AI pushed back insisting that as humans had fed data into the Maven, humans not AI were to blame.   This blame game is likely to occur each time an incident such as this occurs.

Militaries generally maintain a library of potential targets – military bases, missile sites, airfields, munition factories, etc. –  in anticipation of armed conflict but obviously over time, those designated targets can change. While trying to keep potential targets updated, planners always imagine they will have time before a conflict to check and recheck the targets. However, in this case, as Bloomberg’s investigation notes:

 “Work that had unfolded in previous conflicts over weeks or months — matching sites from the library, such as buildings, airfields or bases — was completed in a matter of days, according to officials involved in the probe. More than a thousand potential targets had to be reassessed and approved.”

Advocates of the use of AI in military targeting insist that using such systems can speed up ‘the kill chain’ and there is likely to have been pressure from the internal Pentagon pro-AI lobby to demonstrate the speed with which large numbers of targets could be generated. 

Human Machine Interface: Who’s in control?

Palantir has repeatedly said that its ​software does not make ⁠lethal decisions and humans remain responsible for selecting and approving targets.  However, numerous reports have detailed how humans overly rely and trust in computers and AI.   

It is clear that such automation bias is present in the military use of AI. Bloomberg reports the officials they spoke to, who were involved in the investigation of the school strike, as saying

Some Centcom personnel expected Maven to flag stale information or inconsistencies in the underlying intelligence assembled for potential targets

Separately, the article states:   

Two people familiar with the firm’s Pentagon contracts said the government retains primary responsibility for the quality of the information that’s fed into Maven. But they said it’s not uncommon for personnel who use tools such as Maven to develop operational understandings that differ from contractual terms.

The officials Bloomberg spoke to went:

Inside Centcom, which conducted the US attack, some personnel relied too much on the artificial intelligence embedded in Maven Smart System.

Since the Minab strike, Bloomberg reports “Palantir built new capabilities into Maven that ‘re-review underlying intelligence to identify factors that would disqualify a target and flag inconsistencies and inaccuracies that human review may have missed’.

UK pushes ahead with AI targeting

Over the past two years the UK has been pressing ahead with developing its own AI-enabled  targeting and battlefield command system, currently designated the ‘Digital Targeting Web’.  Giving evidence to the Defence Select Committee in July 2026, retired General Sir Richard Barrons, one of the authors of the recent Strategic Defence Review said:

“Essentially, what the web does is to take in every form of thing or capability that senses the operating environment—whether it is satellite, aircraft, drone, mobile phone, ship, vehicle or database, it does not matter; everything that allows you to understand your operating environment—and networks that into a database and secure cloud managed by AI—without AI, you cannot manage it—supervised by clever people. That capability allows you to assemble an understanding of your operating environment to support decision making, including ranking targets and allocating them to weapons systems, whether they are kinetic, from any service, or non-kinetic, like a cyber-attack.

The Defence Investment Plan (DIP), published in June 2026, re-stated the 2025 Strategic Defence Review’s embrace of drones and AI. Funding is being cut from non-military and military budgets to enable this to happen, with a whole variety of UK military AI projects being developed.

A new MoD taskforce – Taskforce RAID (‘Rapid AI Development’) –  has been allocated £100m to speed up the military’s adoption of AI, with ministers giving the taskforce  “exemptions from standard financial and procedural controls”.  At the same time, the MoD  has replaced its AI Ethics Advisory panel with a new AI Expert Advisory Group. Experts apparently being preferred to ethics.

Will lessons be learned?

Britain is pushing rapidly ahead with integrating AI and machine learning tools into is military targeting processes, with the FT even declaring over the summer ‘UK military looks at allowing lethal strikes without human approval‘. There is a real danger that ministers and military officials, dazzled by the possibilities that AI companies set before them, will give primacy to speed over care.

The British public however, wants and expects that its military will, at the very least, stick to the long-established global rules around the conduct of warfare – international law and in particular, International Humanitarian Law.  IHL mandates that war must be a last resort and that that any use of force must ensure that civilians are protected and that a clear distinction is made between military and civilian targets.

Yet even that most pro-military voices accept that civilians are regularly and repeatedly killed in aerial bombing. The public are continually told in the aftermath of such strikes that they are an ‘aberration’, or ‘honest’ and ‘genuine’ mistakes.  But when ‘mistakes’ repeatedly happen, not to see the systemic failure is simply to be in denial.

Now, when AI is already enabling 1,000 targets to be identified and struck in a single day, even a 1% ‘failure rate’ could result in 10 civilian casualties incidents a day.  The way that AI is both increasing the number of targets and enabling a huge increase in the number of strikes will simply and inevitably lead to more civilian casualties.

As we approach an important moment in efforts to establish a treaty on the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons – the November 2026 Review Meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) – signs are not good. Reports from the final preparatory meeting in Geneva detail how the larger military states watered down language and removed key elements from a draft document.

The UK should be standing up for adherence to international law and primacy of the protection of civilians at the heart of its defence and military policies. Yet it should be remembered, that on the very same day that news began to circulate about the awful strike on the Minab school, the UK gave permission to the US to use the USAF base at Fairford in Gloucestershire for strikes on Iran, a military attack which international law experts describe as “a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter.“

While some argue that miliary AI systems can somehow be made to be ‘ethical’ the real lesson to be learned from Minab is that we are on the precipice of great danger. The rush to develop and deploy AI systems in warfare has to be resisted.     

Graves being dug for those killed in the Minab school strike.

Drone footage shows ‘manifestly unlawful’ US strike on civilians; Trump vows to rip-up drone treaty

The US killed 11 people in a reported drone strike on a small boat in the Caribbean Sea on 3 September. Although it has not been confirmed that the strike was carried out by a drone, President Trump shared drone footage of the strike on his social media. In August it was revealed that Trump had secretly signed a directive ordering the Pentagon to begin military  operations against drug cartels.

Screen grab from drone video shared by President Trump.

While US officials alleged that the boat targeted was carrying drugs being transported by members of the Tren de Aragua cartel, multiple legal scholars and experts have argued that the strike was “manifestly unlawful.”

Professor Luke Moffett of Queens University Belfast told the BBC that while “force can be used to stop a boat, generally this should be non-lethal measures.” Any use of force must be “reasonable and necessary in self-defence where there is immediate threat of serious injury or loss of life to enforcement officials.”  The US and other states regularly stop boats in international waters as part of law enforcement activity without resorting to the use of lethal force.   

Much more significantly, however, is the grave violation of international law that is deliberate, premeditated targeting of civilians. Claire Finkelstein, professor of national security law at the University of Pennsylvania, said “There’s no authority for this whatsoever under international law. It was not an act of self-defense. It was not in the middle of a war. There was no imminent threat to the United States.”  Finklestein went on to make the clear and obvious connection between the strike and the on-going, two-decades long US drone targeted killing programme which has significantly blurred the lines between law enforcement and armed conflict.

While the US alleges that the occupants of the boat were members of an organised criminal gang and President Trump and other administration officials have began to publicly talk about the threat of ‘Narco terrorists’, that in no way makes the targets of this strike combatants under the laws of war.  While civilians are regularly and persistently victims of  drone and air strikes, the deliberate targeting of non-combatants is still shocking.

New York University law professor Ryan Goodman, who previously worked as a lawyer in Pentagon, told the New York Times that “It’s difficult to imagine how any lawyers inside the Pentagon could have arrived at a conclusion that this was legal rather than the very definition of murder under international law rules that the Defense Department has long accepted.”

In the aftermath of the strike and questioning by the media, administration officials struggled to justify the legality of the strike, resorting to arguing that it was a matter of self-defence. Significantly, senior officials said that further such operations were likely. 

Trump and the MTCR

Meanwhile, President Trump is reportedly returning to a plan formulated during his first administration to overturn controls on the export of US armed drones. Trump attempted in 2020, as we reported, to get the other state signatories of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to accept that Predator/Reaper-type drones should be moved out of the most strongly controlled group (Category I) into the lesser group (Category II). Other states, however, gave this short shrift, much to Trumps annoyance.     

According to the Reuters report, the new move involves “designating drones as aircraft… rather than missile systems”  which will enable the US to then “sidestep” its treaty obligations. The move will aid US plans to sell hundreds of armed drones to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar.  

Whether this will convince other states is highly doubtful, but it is likely that Trump and his administration will not care. Such a move will of course open the flood gates for other states to unilaterally reinterpret arms control treaties in their favour in the same way and will also likely spur the proliferation of armed drones which will only further increase civilian harm.  

Collateral Damage: Economics and ethics are casualties in the militarisation of AI

The current government places a central emphasis on technology and innovation in its evolving national security strategy, and wider approach to governance. Labour proposes reviving a struggling British economy through investment in defence with artificial intelligence (AI) featuring as an important component. Starmer’s premiership seems to align several objectives: economic growth, defence industrial development and technological innovation.

Rachel Reeves and John Healey hold roundtable with military company bosses, in front of Reaper drone at RAF Waddington, Feb 2025. Image: MoD

Taken together, these suggest that the government is positioning AI primarily in the context of war and defence innovation. This not only risks undermining the government’s stated ambitions of stability and economic growth but a strategy that prioritises speed over scrutiny, to the neglect of important ethical concerns.

The private defence industry has been positioned as an important pillar of this strategy. Before the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was published, Chancellor Rachel Reeves and Defence Secretary John Healey initiated a Defence and Economic Growth Task Force to drive UK growth through defence capabilities and production. Arms companies are no longer vital for the purposes of national security but now presented as engines of future prosperity. AI is central to this, consistently highlighted in government communications John Healy has explicitly acknowledged that AI will increasingly power the British military whilst Kier Starmer stated that AI ‘will drive incredible change’.

UK focusing AI on military applications

The AI Action Plan, released in January 2025, explicitly links AI to economic growth. Although this included references to ‘responsible use and leadership’, the government has now shifted emphasis on military applications at the expense of crucial policy areas. On the 4th of July, the Science and Technology Secretary Peter Kyle wrote to the Alan Turing Institute – Britain’s premier AI research organization – to refocus research on military applications of AI. The Institutes prior research agenda spanned environmental sustainability, health and national security; under this new directive priorities are fundamentally being narrowed.

BAE Systems Project Odyssey uses AI and VR to make training ‘more realistic’. Image: BAE Systems

Relatedly, the Industrial Strategy released by the government aims to ‘embolden’ the UK’s digital and technologies economy, with £500 million to be delivered through a sovereign AI unit – this however will be focused on ‘building capacity in the most strategically important areas’. Given Peter Kyles re-direction and the overwhelming emphasis the government has placed on AI’s productive capacity in war, it becomes clear that AI research in defence will be at the cost of socially beneficial research in the case of the Alan Turing Institute.

Take Britain’s bleak economic outlook: sluggish productivity; post-Brexit stagnation; strained public finances; mounting government debt repayments; surging costs of living and inflating house prices. There is little evidence to suggest that defence-led growth will yield impactful returns on this catalogue of challenges. No credible economist is going to advise, in the face of these challenges, that investing in defence and redirecting research on AI in the name of national security, is going to give a better return on investment.

Research conducted in America illustrates that investing in health, education, infrastructure and green investment is more likely to give better returns on individual income specifically and broadly, the country’s prospects. Similarly, Lord Blunkett (former minster under Blair) pointed out that without GDP growth, raising defence spending as a share of GDP may not increase the actual funding.

Concerning applications to health outcomes, in August the World Economic Forum reported AI’s striking potential in doubling accuracy in the examination of brains in stroke patients, detecting fractures often missed in overstretched departments and predicting diseases with high confidence. This is critical given the NHS’s persistent challenges: long waiting times, underfunding, regional inequality, staff shortages and bureaucratic inertia.

Health and economic growth are closely related: healthier individuals are more productive, children attend school more consistently, preventative care lowers long-term costs – fundamentally strong health systems add value to the economy and our lives . Yet health is just one example. We are in the embryonic stages of AI development, and by prioritising research on military applications over civilian ones with public value, the government risks undermining, not fuelling long-term economic growth.

Crucially, framing arms companies as a major engine of economic growth is wildly misleading and economically unfounded. Arms sales account for 0.004% of the treasury’s total revenue and the defence industrial base accounts for only 1% of UK economic output. This sector is highly monopolized and so the benefits of ‘growth’ are concentrated among a handful of dominant corporations. Even then, the profit generated will not be reinvested into the UK. The biggest arms company in the UK – BAE Systems – is essentially a joint US-UK company with most of its capital invested in the US with majority shareholders emanating from US investment companies like BlackRock.

Prioritising speed over scrutiny

Beyond the economics, this is part of a wider strategy that signals a growing dismissal of ethical concerns, prioritising speed over scrutiny. The SDR acknowledged that technology is outpacing regulatory frameworks, noting that ‘the UK’s competitors are unlikely to adhere to common ethical standards’. In April 2025, Matthew Clifford – AI advisor to the PM – has been quoted saying ‘speed is everything’. While the Ministry of Defence (in 2022) promised to take an ‘ambitious, safe and responsible’ approach to the development of military AI, the current emphasis on speed sidelines important ethical concerns in the rush for military-technological superiority.

Militarily, the SDR makes plans to invest in drones, autonomous systems and £1 billion for a ‘digital targeting web’. A key foundational principle of International Humanitarian Law is the protection of civilians and their distinction with military targets. An AI-enabled ‘digital targeting web’ – like the one proposed in the SDR – connects sensors and weapons enabling faster detection and killing of human life. These networks would be able to identify and suggest targets faster than humans ever could, leaving soldiers in the best case, minutes, and the worst case, seconds to decide whether the drone should kill.

Digital Warfare: US and UK forces at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar,

One notable example is the Maven Smart System, recently procured by NATO. According to the US Think Tank, the Centre of Security and Emerging Technology, the system makes possible small armies to make ‘1000 tactical decisions per hour’. Some legal scholars have pointed out that the prioritisation of speed, within AI-powered battleground technology, raises questions surrounding the preservation of meaningful human control and restraint in warfare. Israeli use of AI-powered automated targeting systems such as ‘Lavender’ during its assault and occupation of Gaza is illustrative of this point. Systems such as these have been highlighted as one of the factors behind the shockingly high civilian death toll there.

This problem is compounded by the recent research that has shown that new large language models are known to ‘hallucinate’ – producing outputs in error or made up. As these systems become embedded within military decision-making chains, the risk of escalation due to technical failure increase dramatically. A false signal, misread sensor or a corrupted database could lead to erroneous targeting, or unintended conflict escalation.

In sum, the UK’s current approach – predominantly framing AI’s utility though the lens of defence – risks squandering its broader social and economic potential. The redirection of public research institutes, the privileging of AI investment in military applications (or so-called ‘strategic areas’) and the emphasis on speed over scrutiny raises serious concerns. Ethically, the erosion of meaningful human control in battlefield decision-making, the risk of AI-driven conflict escalation and the disregard of international humanitarian principles points to a troubling trajectory. The UK risks drifting towards the ethical standards of Russia and Israel in its use of military AI. A government approach to AI grounded in human security (freedom from fear and want), not war is not only more ethical but far more likely to generate sustainable economic growth for the United Kingdom.

  • Matthew Croft is a postgraduate student at Kings College London studying Conflict, Security and Development with a particular interest on the ethics of national security and the politics of technology.

Proceed with caution: Lords warn over development of military AI and killer robots

Click to open report

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) for the purposes of warfare through the development of AI-powered autonomous weapon systems – ‘killer robots’ –  “is one of the most controversial uses of AI today”, according to a new report by an influential House of Lords Committee.

The committee, which spent ten months investigating the application of AI to weapon systems and probing the UK government’s plans to develop military AI systems, concluded that the risks from autonomous weapons are such that the government “must ensure that human control is consistently embedded at all stages of a system’s lifecycle, from design to deployment”.

Echoing concerns which Drone Wars UK has repeatedly raised, the Lords found that the stated aspiration of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to be “ambitious, safe, responsible” in its use of AI “has not lived up to reality”, and that although MoD has claimed that transparency and challenge are central to its approach, “we have not found this yet to be the case”.

The cross-party House of Lords Committee on AI in Weapon Systems was set up in January 2023 at the suggestion of Liberal Democrat peer Lord Clement-Jones, and started taking evidence in March.    The committee heard oral evidence from 35 witnesses and received nearly 70 written evidence submissions, including evidence from Drone Wars UK.

The committee’s report is entitled ‘Proceed with Caution: Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems’ and ‘proceed with caution’ gives a fair summary of its recommendations.  The panel was drawn entirely from the core of the UK’s political and military establishment, and at times some members appeared to have difficulty in grasping the technical concepts underpinning the technologies behind autonomous weapons.  Under the circumstances the committee was never remotely likely to recommend that the government should not commit to the development of new weapons systems based on advanced technology, and in many respects its report provides a road-map setting out the committee’s views on how the MoD should go ahead in integrating AI into weapons systems and build public support for doing this.

Nevertheless, the committee has taken a sceptical view of the advantages claimed for autonomous weapons systems; has recognised the very real risks that they pose; and has proposed safeguards to mitigate the worst of the risks alongside a robust call for the government to “lead by example in international engagement on regulation of AWS [autonomous weapon systems]”.  Despite hearing from witnesses who argued that autonomous weapons “could be faster, more accurate and more resilient than existing weapon systems, could limit the casualties of war, and could protect “our people from harm by automating ‘dirty and dangerous’ tasks””, the committee was apparently unconvinced, concluding that “although a balance sheet of benefits and risks can be drawn, determining the net effect of AWS is difficult” – and that “this was acknowledged by the Ministry of Defence”.

Perhaps the  most important recommendation in the committee’s report relates to human control over autonomous weapons.  The committee found that:

The Government should ensure human control at all stages of an AWS’s lifecycle. Much of the concern about AWS is focused on systems in which the autonomy is enabled by AI technologies, with an AI system undertaking analysis on information obtained from sensors. But it is essential to have human control over the deployment of the system both to ensure human moral agency and legal compliance. This must be buttressed by our absolute national commitment to the requirements of international humanitarian law.

Read more →

Military AI: MoD’s timid approach to challenging ethical issues will not be enough to prevent harm

Papers released to Drone Wars UK by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that progress in preparing ethical guidance for Ministry of Defence (MoD) staff working on military artificial intelligence (AI) projects is proceeding at a snail’s pace.  As a result, MoD’s much vaunted AI strategy and ethical principles are at risk of failing as the department races ahead to develop AI as a key military technology.

Minutes of meetings of MoD’s Ethical Advisory Panel show that although officials have repeatedly stressed the need to focus on implementation of AI programmes, the ethical framework and guidelines needed to ensure that AI systems are safe and responsible are still only in draft form and there is “not yet a distinct sense of a clear direction” as to how they will be developed.

The FOI papers also highlight concerns about the transparency of the panel’s work.  Independent members of the panel have repeatedly stressed the need for the panel to work in an open and transparent manner, yet MoD refuses to publish the terms of membership, meeting minutes, and reports prepared for the panel.  With the aim of remedying this situation, Drone Wars UK is publishing the panel documents released in response to our FOI request as part of this blog article (see pdf files at the end of the article).

The Ministry of Defence AI Ethics Advisory Panel

One of the aims of the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy, published in June 2022, was to set out MoD’s “clear commitment to lawful and ethical AI use in line with our core values”.  To help meet this aim MoD published a companion document, entitled ‘Ambitious, safe, responsible‘ alongside the strategy to represent “a positive blueprint for effective, innovative and responsible AI adoption”.

‘Ambitious, safe, responsible’ had two main foundations: a set of ethical principles to guide MoD’s use of AI and an Ethics Advisory Panel, described as “an informal advisory board” to assist with policy relating to the safe and responsible development and use of AI.  The document stated that the panel had assisted in formulating the ethical principles and listed the members of the panel, who are drawn from within Ministry of Defence and the military, industry, and universities and civil society.

The terms of reference for the panel were not published in the ‘Ambitious, safe, responsible’ document, but the FOI papers provided to Drone Wars UK show that it is tasked with advising on:

  • “The development, maintenance and application of a set of ethical principles for AI in Defence, which will demonstrate the MOD’s position and guide our approach to responsible AI across the department.
  • “A framework for implementing these principles and related policies / processes across Defence.
  • “Appropriate governance and decision-making processes to assure ethical outcomes in line with the department’s principles and policies”.

The ethical principles were published alongside the Defence AI Strategy, but more than two years after the panel first met – and despite a constant refrain at panel meetings on the need to focus on implementation – it has yet to make substantial progress on the second and third of these objectives.  An implementation framework and associated policies and governance and decision-making processes have yet to appear.  This appears in no way to be due to shortcomings on behalf of the panel, who seem to have a keen appetite for their work, but rather is the result of slow progress by MoD.  In the meantime work is proceeding at full speed ahead on the development of AI systems in the absence of these key ethical tools.

The work of the panel

The first meeting of the panel, held in March 2021, was chaired by Stephen Lovegrove, the then Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence.  The panel discussed the MoD’s work to date on developing an AI Ethics framework and the panel’s role and objectives.  The panel was to be a “permanent and ongoing source of scrutiny” and “should provide expert advice and challenge” to MoD, working through a  regular quarterly meeting cycle.  Read more →

Small drones, big problem. Two new reports examine the rise and rise of armed ‘one-way attack’ drones 

From top: Israeli Harop, Iranian Shaded 136, Polish Warmate.

Over the past few years  – and particularly in the on-going war in Ukraine – we have seen the rise in use of what has become known as ‘kamikaze’ or  ‘suicide’ drones.  Two new excellent reports have just been released which examine these systems.  ‘One-Way Attack Drones: Loitering Munitions of the Past and Present’ written by Dan Gettinger, formerly of the Bard Drone Center and ‘Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability’ by Ingvild Bode & Tom Watts,  examine between them the history, current use, and growing concern about the increasing autonomy of such systems.

A drone by any other name…?

Firstly, to address the elephant in the room: are these systems ‘drones’?

Naming has always been a keenly fought aspect of the debate about drones, with sometimes bitter conflict over whether such platforms should be named ‘unmanned aerial vehicles’ (UAVS), ‘remotely piloted air systems’ (RPAS) or ‘drones’. ‘Drones’ has been the term that has stuck, particularly in mainstream media, but is regularly used interchangeably with UAV (with ‘unmanned’ being replaced in recent years by ‘uncrewed’ for obvious reasons).  While many in the military now accept the term ‘drone’ and are happy to use it depending on the audience, some continue to insist that it belittles both capabilities of the system and those who operate them.

Whichever term is used, a further aspect of the naming debate is that an increasing number and type of military aerial systems are being labelled as ‘drones’.  While all these systems have significant characteristics in common (aerial systems, unoccupied, used for surveillance/intelligence gathering and/or attack), they can also be very different in terms of size and range; can carry out very different missions; have different effects; and raise different legal and ethical issues.

One type of such system is the so-called ‘suicide’ or ‘kamikaze’ drone  – perhaps better labelled ‘one way attack’ drone.  There are several different categories of this type of drone, and while they are are used to carry out remote lethal attacks and therefore have significant aspects in common with the much larger Reaper or Bayraktar drones, they are significantly different in that they are not designed to be re-used, but rather are expendable as the warhead is part of the structure of the system which is destroyed in use. Importantly, while loitering munitions are a sub-set of ‘one way attack’ drones, not all one-way attack drones are loitering munitions.

Dan Gettinger’s report ‘One-Way Attack Drones: Loitering Munitions of the Past and Present’ helpfully sets out a history of the development of these systems and identifies three sub categories: anti-radar systems, portable or ‘backpackable’ systems and Iranian systems.  He has compiled a helpful dataset of over 200 such systems (although not all are currently in operation). All of these, he argues, can be traced back to “the transition from the era of jet-powered target drones to that of remotely piloted vehicles.” Read more →