Tag: Transparency

The UK’s forgotten war: British drone strikes continue against ISIS

Chris Cole

Three weeks ago, on June 10, a British Reaper drone began tracking a motorcycle in north-western Syria near the border with Turkey as it began to be ridden by a someone described by British intelligence as “a known member” of ISIS. The individual, who had apparently been monitored by the drone “for some time” was tracked and killed by a Hellfire missile fired by the drone a short while later. 

Aftermath of UK drone strike in NW Syria, Jun 10 2025 : Image credit : The White Helmets

Local reports from the ground said the man was killed in the blast, with another person also injured and taken to hospital. This was the second British drone strike in north-west Syria this year and the only reason we know about it was a MoD spokesperson boasted about it to The Sun this weekend.

A forgotten, fitful war

For most, the US/UK war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has been virtually forgotten   Other  awful conflicts –  in Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan –  have taken our attention over the past two years, not to mention the more recent unlawful Israeli and the US bombing of Iran. And in many ways this is understandable.  Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’ attack followed by Israel’s on-going genocidal war on Gaza has stunned the world.   

Yet, it should still matter  – particular to British public, media and parliamentarians  – that British forces continue to engage in a seemingly never ending, fitful war in Syria and Iraq.

MoD secrecy 

In addition, the war gets little attention because the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has decided it will no longer talk about ongoing UK military operations. After a decade of responding to our Freedom of Information (FoI) requests on the UK’s use of Reaper drones, for example, the MoD abruptly began to refuse them at the beginning of 2023 arguing that the changed global situation mean that oversight and transparency had to be curbed. Other organisations, journalists and parliamentary committees too have seen a decline in transparency from the MoD, both about UK military operations but also about UK military developments in general.

While MoD has argued that the ‘geopolitical situation’ means they have to be much more ‘circumspect’, the significant drop in the ability of the media, parliament and the public to scrutinise the MoD and hold the armed forces to account will no doubt be welcomed by them for a variety of reasons.   

Read more →

Drone Wars urges transparency and public oversight of UK military operations at Information Tribunal

Chris Cole

Drone Wars team at the Tribunal

Drone Wars appeared before a two-day information tribunal this week seeking to overturn the decision of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to end the release of statistical information on the use of Reaper drones and other armed aircraft on military operations.  This information has been a crucial way for the public and parliament to have oversight of UK military action and without the data, it will be much hard to hold the UK to account.

The MoD has been responding to our Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for statistical information since 2010.  In January 2023, the MoD abruptly ended the practice arguing that the information could not be provided due to exemptions provided under Section 23 (Security bodies) or Section 24 (National Security), and Section 26 (Defence) of the Act.

Section 23 and Section 24 are used as ‘alternatives’ to disguise which exemption is being relied upon, that is whether the information comes from or relates to Special Forces, the intelligence service or similar bodies, or whether it is needed to protect ‘national security’.

The hearing took place partly in open session with Drone Wars present, but it also went into closed session when we were excluded, in order to hear evidence in secret.

The MoD provided a witness statement from Group Captain Redican, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Joint Air Force Component and someone with direct experience of Operation Shader in response to our appeal.  Although the full witness statement contains 50 numbered paragraphs, only 15 were visible to us, the rest was redacted.

Documents also disclosed to us in the run up to the Tribunal revealed that at an earlier stage of our appeal, the Information Commissioner had asked the MoD to provide it with evidence that disclosure of the statistics to Drone Wars had caused harm or prejudice to the UK.  The MoD wrote to the Information Commissioner:

“The information previously released cannot be directly linked to harm to UK forces in its current operating environment (predominantly Operation Shader) however it has revealed capability details for a system that is capable of use on global operations where the threat environment may be significantly different against a more sophisticated adversary.”

In his witness statement, Gp. Capt Redican stated:

“I am aware that the MoD has previously provided responses to similar requests issued by Mr Cole.  The MoD now seeks to withhold information which it was previously content to disclose.  This is due to the changing national and security context, detailed further below.” [note the following four paragraphs were redacted]

Asked to explain what he meant by the ‘changing national and security context’, Redican explained that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK was now preparing for ‘State on State’ warfare rather than use of armed force against non-state groups.  At the same time, he went on, the situation in the Middle East had changed since the beginning of Operation Shader, with Iran – which had previously engaged in the same task of opposing ISIS – but now, “was a major actor in that theatre, and their actions are contrary to British interests.”

Drone Wars strongly argued that the statistical data that we sought was simply not capable of providing insight into ‘techniques, tactics and procedures’ at the level of detail which could cause prejudice to the UK as claimed, but instead gave a broad overview which enabled public oversight.

MoD ‘drawing a line in the sand’

Redican argued that it was not about “the specifics of information”  but that “a line in the sand had to be drawn somewhere”.  He went on “at some point we have to set a new precedent. We are going to have to begin to protect our capabilities more and more.”  Read more →

FoI challenge shows MoD claim of “thousands of cutting edge” drones in service to be nonsense

Chris Cole

In response to questions raised by the Financial Times regarding the number of drones in service, the MoD insisted in December 2023 that “we have invested heavily in over 30 such programmes over the last several years and have thousands of cutting edge aerial vehicles that are designed to make our armed forces more lethal and effective.”

List of UAV programmes MoD says it has funded “over last several years”.

Following a long-running Freedom of Information (FoI) wrangle with the MoD, in which the Information Commissioner threated legal proceeding against the Department,  Drone Wars UK finally received a list of the 32 UAV programmes which the MoD said it has funded.

However, of the 32 programmes listed only seven have resulted in drones which are currently in service (one of which is a naval target/training drone), while another four relate to drones which are planned to be in service in the future.

Of the remaining programmes, seven relate to drones that have been retired or are due to be retired this year, five are for trials (two of which have ended), two are funding broad research and two are funding for programmes not related to the development of military UAVs. The names of five other programmes have been redacted.

In total these programmes add up to around 250 military drones currently in service, with another 250 due to be in service in the next year or two – far from the ‘thousands’ claimed by the MoD in December.

While it is unfortunately no longer surprising that MoD reporting on its programmes is questionable, the extent of smoke and mirrors around UK’s drone programme in particular is disturbing.  Cost overruns seem endemic, an RAF Squadron specifically set up four years ago to trial new drones has yet to undertake any such tests and now we find that we are being misled about basic inventory figures.

Analysis of drone programmes listed by MoD in its FoI response

We believe that there is a real debate to be had about the efficacy, legality and ethics of drone warfare – even more so given the increasing autonomy of these systems.  While some insist that that the UK must invest even more heavily in drones and autonomous weapons arguing they are transforming warfare, serious questions remain.  However neither Parliament nor the public cannot properly debate and discuss these issues without appropriately factual information. While we have seen increased secrecy from the UK government around the deployment and use of drones – ostensibly due to what is described as the ‘geopolitical situation’ – we now have misleading information about UK drone numbers and development programmes given to the UK media.

Around the world we are increasingly seeing new and emerging technology being adopted by militaries in order to  ‘increase lethality’.  The UK has argued that it should be at the forefront of this new way of warfare – “all the warfare of the future” as Boris Johnson described it when discussing the Integrated Review.  However it is crucial that there is proper accountability and oversight of these developments, something that is simply not possible without proper transparency.  Misinformation here, whatever some may say, is simply wrong and unhelpful.

Read more →

Tribunal upholds MoD refusal to disclose details of UK Reaper drone missions outside of Op Shader

Chris Cole

Click to read Decision Notice

Fifteen months after hearing our appeal, an Information Tribunal handed down its decision this week rejecting our arguments that basic details about the deployment of armed Reaper drones outside of Operation Shader (Iraq/Syria) by the UK needed to be released to enable public and parliamentary oversight over such deployments.

Both Clive Lewis MP and Baroness Vivienne Stern, Vice-Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Drones and Modern Conflict had submitted statements to the Tribunal supporting our appeal.  Clive Lewis argued that  the refusal to answer these questions about the deployment of Reaper is “a serious backward step in terms of transparency and accountability.”   Baroness Stern stated:

“Despite repeated attempts by myself and colleagues to attain even the most basic information about the UK’s drone deployments, policy, and commitments, Parliament has not been provided with the accurate and timely information needed to meaningfully carry out its constitutional scrutiny role. Whilst certain details must be kept secret in order to ensure operational and national security, the current trend of withholding information about the use of drones purely because it is seen as an “intelligence” asset, as well as withholding vital information on the UK’s growing military capabilities and commitments is deeply concerning and unjustified.”

While insisting that it was neither confirming nor denying the deployment, the MoD argued against the release of the information on three broad grounds . As the Decision Notice states:

“the MOD’s key concern about the release of the requested information was that it could lead an adversary to infer the absence or presence of UK personnel. In his [The MoD’s witness’] opinion were the locations to be released or inferred from a combination of requested data and already published material (the “mosaic effect”), there would be an elevated risk to any potential personnel in that location and an increased risk of hostile acts against them.”

A second concern was

“there would be an increased risk to any nation hosting the Reaper operations as an adversary may target a hostile act at the host nation rather than the UK which may be a more difficult target. Thereby undermining the UK’s relationship with that nation and undermining military operations conducted from that location.”

Finally, and most concerning from a scrutiny and oversight point of view the MoD argued (again quoting Decision Notice)

“The effectiveness of operations conducted using Reaper outside Operation Shader in future depend, in part, on a greater degree of ambiguity as to the employment of Reaper in order to be successful. It is important to retain a degree of ambiguity regarding the full extent of Reaper operations now in order to maintain this flexibility in the future. “

Drone Wars argued strongly that the information requested –  a single figure of the number of sorties undertaken outside of Operation Shader and their broad, geographic location (i.e. ‘The Middle East’) – was not capable of causing the prejudice alleged.  We also pointed out to the Tribunal that the MoD has previously released the number of sorties undertaken outside of Operation Shader (In response to our questions about the targeted killing of Naweed Hussain in 2018) without any of the prejudice or harm suggested, but that seems to have been ignored by the tribunal.  Read more →

EU borders agency must improve information access arrangements following complaint by Drone Wars UK

Peter Burt

The European Ombudsman has ruled that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, should reform its access to information arrangements following complaints about difficulties in obtaining information made by Drone Wars UK and German open government platform FragDenStaat.

The Ombudsman’s ruling follows a two year investigation which examined how Frontex deals with requests for public access to documents, and particularly requests submitted by email and through civil society access to information websites such as FragDenStaat and AskTheUK.org.  At present Frontex only accepts communications through its own difficult-to-use communication portal and  refuses to communicate by e-mail or third party information access websites – a complicated and unnecessary hurdle for anyone seeking information about the organisation.

As well as investigating the portal requirement and the ability to submit and to receive documents by e-mail the Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly also inquired into concerns about restrictions imposed by the copyright of Frontex documents, long-term accessibility of documents through the portal, and Frontex’s requirement for those requesting information to submit personal identification and the lack of routes to allow this.

Border Drones

Drone Wars UK submitted an information request to Frontex in July 2020 as part of our ‘Crossing A Line‘ investigation, in which we highlighted the growing use of drones for border control operations and the threats to human rights which this poses.  Read more →

Unreported drone strikes revealed as complete list of UK air and drone strikes against ISIS published  

Chris Cole

Drone Wars is today publishing a sortable and searchable dataset of all known UK air and drone strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria since September 2014.  Included in the data are a small number of UK drones strikes that occurred in the second half of 2018 that were not reported at the time.

The data, compiled from official sources, contains more than 1,650 individual reports with the vast majority detailing the target, the aircraft used to launch the strike and which munitions were used.  Our aim in publishing this dataset is to both aid transparency and to encourage greater study of the impact of UK air and drone operations.

Transparency

While the MoD currently has a list of UK air strikes in Iraq and Syria on its website (available here), the reports in many cases are only a summary of the original releases, with vital detail edited out. For example the entry for 18 January 2018 reads as follows:

“2 Reapers struck 6 terrorist targets, including 2 armed trucks, 2 lorry-bombs, a mortar and a Daesh held building, in eastern Syria.”

However the original report, available in our dataset, reads:

“SDF operations north of Abu Kamal on Thursday 18 January were supported by two RAF Reapers as well as other coalition aircraft. One of our Reapers used a Hellfire to knock out an armed truck that was firing on the SDF, then pursued a second such vehicle as it drove away and destroyed it with another Hellfire. A third Hellfire was used in a successful attack on a Daesh-held building.  The second Reaper also conducted three attacks; a Hellfire missile silenced a mortar spotted firing from beneath some trees, and a further missile and a GBU-12 guided bomb took care of two truck-bombs. As well as conducting their own attacks, the Reapers also provided targeting and surveillance support to seven attacks by coalition aircraft, against a range of terrorist positions, including two engineering vehicles being used by Daesh, and a large group of terrorists mounted on motorcycles, whom our aircraft tracked to a compound, where they were successfully targeted by a fast jet.”

Perhaps even more importantly, more than 40 reports of UK strikes – including the first four to occur in late September/ early October 2014 – are simply absent from the MoD’s list.  In addition, the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan in August 2015, which was a separate, UK intelligence-led, mission and not part of coalition operations against ISIS, is also not included in the MoD’s list.  All of these are included in Drone Wars dataset.  For many reasons we think that it is important that a full list of UK air strikes is publicly available.  At the end of UK air operations in Afghanistan in 2014, the MoD deleted details of UK strikes in Afghanistan from its website.

Unreported drones strikes in 2018

Intriguingly, there are eight Reaper drone strikes included in the MoD’s summary list for which no details were released at the time of the strikes  All of these occurred in Syria during the second half of 2018 and several have the potential to be possible targeted killings. It is possibly relevant that these unreported strikes occurred in the months following the May 2018 announcement that a UK drone strike in eastern Syria had killed a civilian.  Read more →