Outdragon revealed: UK secretly using US signal intelligence pod on drone operations

Outdragon revealed: UK secretly using US signal intelligence pod on drone operations

Chris Cole
US MQ-9 Reaper drone carrying surveillance pod flying over a Polish base.  Credit: The Aviationist

Drone Wars UK can reveal that British armed Reaper drones have secretly been equipped with a US intelligence gathering capability called ‘Outdragon’ since around 2019.

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) pods on US Reaper and Predator drones have been used to geolocate, track and kill individuals via signals from mobile phones, wireless routers or other communication devices using a variety of systems developed by intelligence agencies with codenames such as Airhandler and Gilgamesh.

In response to our FoI requests on the capability, the Ministry of Defence is refusing to confirm or deny any information other than the existence of a 2019 contract to integrate it with UK Reaper drones.

The existence of Outdragon and its use by the UK was confirmed by the (possibly mistaken) publication online of a series of MoD maintenance forms relating to the UK’s new MQ-9  ‘Protector’ drone.

Image from: Flying Log and Fatigue Data Sheet – MOD Form 725(Protector RG-1)(AV)

Documents released by Edward Snowden show that UK AIRHANDLER missions are developed and controlled from the UK’s Joint Service Signals Unit (JSSU) at RAF Digby, which is the nearest military base to the home of UK drone warfare, RAF Waddington.  A 2017 Intercept article, based on documents from Snowden, showed that US and British intelligence officials worked “side by side” at the base using AIRHANDLER with UK Reaper drones to gather data and develop near real-time intelligence for military and intelligence operations. Read more →

Proceed in Harmony: The Government replies to the Lords on AI in Weapon Systems

Peter Burt
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Last December a select committee of the House of Lords published ‘Proceed with Caution’: a report setting out the findings of a year-long investigation into the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in weapon systems.

Members of the Lords committee were drawn entirely from the core of the UK’s political and security establishment, and their report was hardly radical in its conclusions.  Nevertheless, their report made a number of useful recommendations and concluded that the risks from autonomous weapons are such that the government “must ensure that human control is consistently embedded at all stages of a system’s lifecycle, from design to deployment”.  The Lords found that Ministry of Defence (MoD) claims to be “ambitious, safe, responsible” in its use of AI had “not lived up to reality”.

The government subsequently pledged to reply to the Lords report, and on 21 February published its formal response.  Perhaps the best way of summarising the tone of the response is to quote from its concluding paragraph:  ““Proceed with caution”, the overall message of this [Lords] report, mirrors the MoD’s approach to AI adoption.”   There is little new in the government response and nothing in it will be of any surprise to observers and analysts of UK government policy on AI and autonomous technologies.  The response merely outlines how the government intends to follow the course of action it had already planned to take, reiterating the substance of past policy statements such as the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy and puffing up recent MoD activity and achievements in the military AI field.

As might be imagined, the response takes a supportive approach to recommendations from the Lords which are aligned to its own agenda, such as developing high-quality data sets, improving MoD’s AI procurement arrangements, and undertaking research into potential future AI capabilities.  On the positive side, it is encouraging to see that in some areas concerns over the risks and limitations of AI technologies are highlighted, for example in the need for review and rigorous testing of new systems.  MoD acknowledges that rigorous testing would be required before an operator could be confident in an AI system’s use and effect, that current procedures, including the Article 36 weapons review process, will need to be adapted and updated, and that changes in operational environment may require weapon systems to be retested.

The response also reveals that the government is working on a Joint Service Publication covering all the armed forces to give more concrete directions and guidance on implementing MoD’s AI ethical principles.  The document, ‘Dependable AI in Defence’, will set out the governance, accountabilities, processes and reporting mechanisms needed to translate ethical policies into tangible actions and procedures.  Drone Wars UK and other civil society organisations have long called for MoD to formulate such guidance as a priority.

In some areas the MoD has relatively little power to meet the committee’s recommendations, such as in adjusting government pay scales to match market rates and attract qualified staff to work on MoD AI projects.  Here the rejoinder is little more than flannel, mentioning that “a range of steps” are being taken “to make Defence AI an attractive and aspirational choice.”

In other respects the Lords have challenged MoD’s approach more substantially, and in such cases these challenges are rejected in the government response.  This is so in relation to the Lords’ recommendation that the government should adopt a definition for autonomous weapons systems (AWS).  The section of the response dealing with this point lays bare the fact that the government’s priority “is to maximise our military capability in the face of growing threats”.  A rather unconvincing assertion that “the irresponsible and unethical behaviours and outcomes about which the Committee is rightly concerned are already prohibited under existing legal mechanisms” is followed by the real reason for the government’s opposition: “there is a strong tendency in the ongoing debate about autonomous weapons to assert that any official AWS definition should serve as the starting point for a new legal instrument prohibiting certain types of systems”.  Any international treaty which would outlaw autonomous weapon systems “represents a threat to UK Defence interests” the government argues.  The argument ends with a side-swipe at Russia and an attempt to shut down further debate by claiming that the debate is taking place “at the worst possible time, given Russia’s action in Ukraine and a general increase in bellicosity from potential adversaries.”  This basically seems to be saying that in adopting a definition for autonomous weapon systems the UK would be making itself more vulnerable to Russian military action.  Really? Read more →

MoD publish new UK ‘Drone Strategy’ and its embarrassing, superficial nonsense.

Chris Cole
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The Ministry of Defence (MoD) finally published its long-promised strategy on UK plans to be “a world leader in defence uncrewed systems’ and to say its underwhelming would be an understatement.  The document – stripping out graphics, self-promotional photographs and the glossary –  runs to around four pages, much of which is filled with management speak that would make David Brent wince.   Apparently, through “Pan-Defence Excellence” the MoD will be “enshrining the principle of iterative – or spiral – capability development” to create a more “predictable demand signal.”

In a nutshell, the (ahem) ‘strategy’ seems to be: ‘learning from the war in Ukraine we will work even closer with the defence industry’.  The Minister for Defence Procurement James Cartlidge and the Commander of Strategic Command, General Sir Jim Hockenhull announced the strategy at a press event at Malloy Systems, the drone company recently taken over by BAE Systems.

The strategy document contains no details about timescales, programmes, spending or even categories of uncrewed systems that the MoD will be focusing on.  The closest the document comes to any information on future plans is a bullet point that says “the RAF is testing cost-effective expendable Autonomous Collaborative Platforms.”  Another bullet point argues that “the army has a long history of uncrewed systems and development.”  Pretty sure someone should have at least added the word ‘chequered’ in there.

Drone Strategy launched at Malloy Systems. Credit: BAE Systems

Sifting through this thin gruel we can pick out one or two points.

  • In his Introduction, Minister for Defence Procurement James Cartlidge argues “it is in the uncrewed space that we will increasingly drive the mass of our forces…” Drones, in other words, are seen as a way of increasing the size and lethality of UK armed forces as personnel recruitment slumps and spending on big-ticket items eats up the budget.
  • There is a recognition that drone warfare is “not only here to stay but likely to increase as technology expands opportunities for [drone] employment.” This is due to the fact, argues the document, that “inexpensive commercial and military technologies have democratised [drone] employment.”  Drone warfare, it is acknowledged,  is no longer the preserve of larger Western states.
  • The strategy suggests that the “initial priority is the successful delivery of the Ukraine-UK uncrewed systems initiative.” Given that the current use of drones in this conflict is primarily small, first person view (FPV) drones or one-way attack drones, it is likely that funding of  new UK developments will be in this area.   Whether that will be effective for UK security needs is questionable to say the least.
  • The decline in transparency and debate about the development, use, legality and efficacy of drone warfare from the government is likely to continue. While,  the document pays lip-service  to “the importance of public engagement” on these issues and insists it is  “committed … to keeping the public informed of our progress and developments”  these lofty aims are caveated with need to protect “necessary operational sensitivity” and the requirement to “balance transparency with security.”

All in all, it is likely this strategy document will be put on a shelf and quickly forgotten.

The Next Wave: the emergence of drones at sea

Peter Burt
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In recent months maritime drones have hit the news headlines as they are increasingly deployed in conflict hot-spots around the world’s seas.  The war in Ukraine, tensions in the ocean around China, and most recently armed attacks on shipping in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea have all been characterised by the use of various types of drones – uncrewed aircraft, drone boats, unpowered marine ‘glider’ craft, and underwater vehicles.

Our new study, ‘The Next Wave’, investigates the development and use of maritime drones and the likely future implications of their use in combat.  While uncrewed boats have long been used in warfare – with the US Navy first using uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) for mine clearance in the 1990’s – today, maritime drones are used by an increasing number of states and non-state groups.  This study reviews the reasons why,  summarizes developments by the major military powers and the UK, and examines a set of case studies to identify how drones have been used during different types of conflict at sea.

Why drones at sea?

Maritime drones are a fraction of the cost of a conventional destroyer or submarine and represent a new vision of naval warfare that exchanges small numbers of high-value military assets for large numbers of cheaper, flexible, and simpler platforms which, working together, have a greater overall capability.  In this vision, platforms can be modular, able to carry a number of payloads such as weapons, sensors, or smaller drones depending on the mission, and work as a connected network using artificial intelligence computing methods to stay in touch with other members of the fleet and with human controllers.  An adversary would be overwhelmed with a multitude of small targets instead of a few large warships.

Drones can gather information about the ocean more cheaply than larger crewed vessels, and may also be able to reach areas that would be inaccessible for a larger ship.  They are not bounded by the physiological limitations of human personnel and can undertake assignments that humans find demanding, such as deep diving or an extended submarine mission.  They are also more easily able to loiter undetected than a larger ship, allowing data to be collected over a longer time period, and can also allow potentially dangerous objects to be examined remotely, reducing risks.

Within the world’s vast oceans, certain locations are particularly strategically important for both military and civilian purposes. These include the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, areas around disputed islands in the South and East China Seas, the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, the Baltic Sea and the English Channel.  These areas often represent choke points and are both crowded with marine traffic and focal points for concentrations of underwater infrastructure.  Drone networks are an attractive option for military planners when undertaking surveillance and reconnaissance operations in such areas.

Military development of maritime drones

The world’s major military powers are all keen to develop drones for use in warfare, recognising the military potential of new technologies, and have all begun research and investment into next-generation weaponry and technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and uncrewed and autonomous systems.  China, Russia and the US and its NATO allies have a highly competitive relationship in these fields, and are actively developing such capabilities, including systems for use in the maritime domain, with Russia lagging somewhat behind China and the US.

Like the larger powers, the UK is keen to exploit the potential of uncrewed and autonomous technology for military purposes.  The Royal Navy sees maritime autonomous systems as a major component of its future fleet, operating on and under the sea and in the air on both front line logistics and support tasks.  To date, the UK has used uncrewed technologies to undertake routine tasks such as survey work and dangerous operations such as minesweeping, and in the longer term it has the aims of automating and roboticising many of the roles of its capital ships and equipping them with uncrewed aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles to contribute to a low cost weaponised sensor network.  The systems currently deployed by the UK are still mainly small scale and / or experimental system and the sums of money involved have been relatively modest. Read more →

Proliferation of armed drones continues apace resulting in numerous civilian casualties

Chris Cole

New data from Drone Wars UK shows that more than forty states now operate large ‘Predator-type’ armed drones, with twenty-two countries having acquired these armed drones since the beginning of 2021, more than doubling the previous number of operators.

A full list of countries that possess MALE armed drones together with details of the types of drones they operate, which countries are likely to become operators in the near future and a short narrative report on each country is available on our ‘Who Has Armed Drones?’ page.

For the first time our data shows that more countries have used these armed drones to undertake strikes within their own borders (15) than for strikes against targets within other states (12).  A number of new users including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Mali have caused significant civilian casualties in drone strikes over the past 12 months.

While the use of smaller ‘suicide’ or one-way attack drones has come to the fore in 2023, particularly for their use in Ukraine and the Red Sea, the larger re-usable systems, known as medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) drones and typified by the US Reaper and Turkish Bayraktar TB2, continues to spread.  Turkey is now the main exporter of such systems with fifteen countries gaining armed drone capability for the first time from Turkey since the beginning of 2021. A  further dozen countries are likely to gain the capability in the near future.

Proliferation leads to civilian casualties

Of the 22 countries that have acquired MALE armed drones since the beginning of 2021, 12 are involved in ongoing internal or external armed conflicts, while a further 7 are states which have simmering tensions with neighbouring states or are repressive regimes.  At least six of the states that have acquired armed drones since 2021 have already used them to launch strikes with a number of these causing civilian casualties.  While Le Monde called Africa ‘the new playground for drone exporters’ with Turkish companies winning multi-million dollar contracts, civilians on the ground continue to pay a high price. Read more →

Accident waiting to happen: UK opens skies to large military drones as crashes continue

Chris Cole
‘Protector’ drone flying from RAF Waddington (Credit; RAF)

As the UK begins to open its airspace to medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) drones for the first time, at least 20 crashes of this type of drone have occurred during 2023. See latest update of our Drone Crash database for full details. It is highly likely that other crashes have occurred that have not been publicly reported.

In November 2023, the RAF began flying its new ‘Protector’ drone (a new version of the Reaper)  from RAF Waddington as part of a short test programme after receiving permission from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The MoD has submitted plans to be allowed to fly drones from RAF Waddington on a permanent basis from Spring 2024.  Meanwhile the US Air Force have submitted plans to the CAA to fly US Global Hawk drones from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire.  It has put an application to fly US Reaper drones from the base on hold, presumably until a decision is made on the Global Hawk flights.

There are now a wide variety of drones used by the military – from small hand-held surveillance systems through exploding so-called ‘suicide drones, to enormous solar powered systems flying at the edge of space. However, MALE drones like the Predator, Reaper and Bayraktar remain the workhorse of military attack drones but due to a variety of reasons, they continue to regularly crash

US Crashes

At least four MQ-9 Reapers and one MQ-1 Gray Eagle have crashed during the year according to media reports. Details are scant as the US has grown increasingly secretive about  such occurrences with USAF ‘mishap’ data not updated since 2021. Alongside these crashes, a US Reaper drone was downed due to a collision with  Russia aircraft over the Black Sea in March, while a US Reaper was shot down off the coast of Yemen  by Houthi rebels in November.

Date Operator Type Phase/details Location / Report
Nov 18,2023 US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper (?) Mid-flight Off coast Somaliland
Aug 22, 2023 US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Landing Kanoya, Japan
May 15,2023 US CBP MQ-9 Reaper Mid-flight Arizona, US
Apr 22, 2023 US Army MQ-1 Gray Eagle Mid-flight Kirkuk, Iraq
Feb, 4, 2023 US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Mid-flight Northern Mali

Bayraktar TB-2 Crashes

At least six Bayraktar TB-2 drones have crashed during 2023.  Two of these occurred after Ukrainian operators lost control of the drones and had them shot down.  Bayraktar’s operated by Burkina Faso and Mali also crashed during the year while Turkish Bayraktar’s operating against Kurdish groups also crashed in Iraq.  Meanwhile the US Air Force shot down a Turkish Anka drone in Syria in October after US forces judged it to be threatening a US military position.  Read more →