Cabinet Minister says UK flying surveillance missions over Gaza

*Important Update (4 December):  Despite stating on camera to two different news programmes that drones had been deployed, the Ministry of Defence has now told journalists that the Minister was incorrect – the UK has not deployed drones but has deployed other surveillance aircraft.   We have amended this blog post.

Late on Saturday 2 December, the Minister of Defence (MoD) issued a short online statement saying that the UK “will conduct surveillance flights over the eastern Mediterranean, including operating in air space over Israel and Gaza.”

On Sunday 3 December, Health Secretary Victoria Atkins, appearing as government spokesperson on Sky News, was asked about the flights and said “The Ministry of Defence has announced that it has sent some unmanned and unarmed, surveillance drones into the region to help look for hostages.”  Subsequently appearing on the BBC’s Laura Kuenssberg show, Atkins repeated that “unarmed and unmanned drones” were being sent to the region to help look for hostages.

Reporting of the MoD’s original statement by BBC and others included a line which stated that aircraft undertaking the missions “will include Shadow R1s, which the Royal Air Force use for intelligence gathering” but this now appears to have been removed from the online statement. The MoD’s statement did not mention drones.

While the  MoD says that “only information relating to hostage rescue will be passed to the relevant authorities” it is likely that electronic, signal and video intelligence of Gaza gathered by the aircraft will end up in the hands of the Israeli Defence Force. If so, many would consider the UK a participant in this horrific conflict which has killed thousands of innocent civilians and seen repeated violations of international law.

While some news organisations reported this as the first UK deployment of aircraft in the conflict, in fact as far back as 13 October the Prime Minister announced that UK surveillance aircraft were to be deployed “to support Israel.”

Since the beginning of 2023, the MoD has increased the level of secrecy surrounding the use of drones, refusing to provide details of UK Reaper operations arguing that it needs “ambiguity” about such deployments.

This latest episode  – where a Cabinet  Minister states on camera that UK drones have been deployed yet the Ministry of Defence refuses to acknowledge the deployment – is another ridiculous example of the secrecy surrounding UK drones.  [Note –  MoD said after this was published that the Minister is incorrect and other aircraft – not drones  – are  being deployed].

Rumour and misinformation about these UK operations are now bound to be rife and could well turn out to be damaging.  While the government will argue that it is undertaking these operations to assist with hostage rescue, it is easy to see how UK aircraft undertaking surveillance operations over Gaza could get further drawn into ‘supporting Israel’ in this horrific conflict.

The reality is that rather than ambiguity and confusion, we need proper parliamentary and public oversight to ensure we do not get drawn further into this conflict.  Rather than deploying more UK military assets, we should be working flat out for a ceasefire.

MoD abruptly ends responding to FoI requests on UK drone operations

MoD goes dark on Reaper operations

After more than a decade of responding to our requests for statistical information about the use of armed drones, the MoD abruptly refused our January 2023 request.  At first we thought it may be an administrative error but it soon became clear that it was a policy decision.

The MoD now argues that the information that it had previously released without any suggestion of harm for more than a decade will now be refused due to the data being related to bodies dealing with security matters (Section 23) and/or national security (Section 24).  Last week, the Information Commissioner finally responded to our appeal, upholding the MoD’s decision based on “confidential submissions” from the MoD.  The Information Commissioners Office wrote:

“Based on submissions provided to him by the MOD during the course of his investigation, the Commissioner is satisfied that the information sought by questions 1b) to 4 of the request either falls within the scope of the exemption provided by section 23(1) of FOIA or falls within the scope of the exemption provided by section 24(1) of FOIA, and that if the exemption engaged is section 24(1) then the public interest favours maintaining the exemption.

The Commissioner cannot elaborate on his rationale behind this finding without compromising the content of the withheld information itself or by revealing which of these two exemptions is actually engaged. The Commissioner appreciates that this is likely to prove frustrating to the complainant. However, the Commissioner would like to emphasise that he has carefully scrutinised the MOD’s submissions and that in doing so he has taken into account the complainant’s position that such information has been previously disclosed.

Transparency thwarted
Summary table of data from FoI requests. Click for full details

Our analysis of the statistical data on UK armed drone operations, gathered via these FoI requests, enabled some understanding of UK’s use of its armed drones over the past decade or more.  Asking a specific set of questions every quarter over several years gave us a dataset which enabled a degree of transparency.

For example when the MoD insisted that its armed drones were primarily used for intelligence gathering – strongly implying drones were rarely being used to launch strikes – the data showed that for periods of time between half and a third of UK air strikes were being carried out by drones.  The data also enabled greater understanding of what was happening on the ground, for example the extent of the switch of UK air and drone strikes to Syria from Iraq in certain periods of the war.  The FoI data also enabled us to discover when strikes had taken place that had not been disclosed by MoD press releases. The data also allowed us to see the number and type of weapons being used and therefore to calculate the cost of the munitions being used. Indeed one response also let slip that the UK drones were firing thermobaric weaponsRead more

Tribunal upholds MoD refusal to disclose details of UK Reaper drone missions outside of Op Shader

Click to read Decision Notice

Fifteen months after hearing our appeal, an Information Tribunal handed down its decision this week rejecting our arguments that basic details about the deployment of armed Reaper drones outside of Operation Shader (Iraq/Syria) by the UK needed to be released to enable public and parliamentary oversight over such deployments.

Both Clive Lewis MP and Baroness Vivienne Stern, Vice-Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Drones and Modern Conflict had submitted statements to the Tribunal supporting our appeal.  Clive Lewis argued that  the refusal to answer these questions about the deployment of Reaper is “a serious backward step in terms of transparency and accountability.”   Baroness Stern stated:

“Despite repeated attempts by myself and colleagues to attain even the most basic information about the UK’s drone deployments, policy, and commitments, Parliament has not been provided with the accurate and timely information needed to meaningfully carry out its constitutional scrutiny role. Whilst certain details must be kept secret in order to ensure operational and national security, the current trend of withholding information about the use of drones purely because it is seen as an “intelligence” asset, as well as withholding vital information on the UK’s growing military capabilities and commitments is deeply concerning and unjustified.”

While insisting that it was neither confirming nor denying the deployment, the MoD argued against the release of the information on three broad grounds . As the Decision Notice states:

“the MOD’s key concern about the release of the requested information was that it could lead an adversary to infer the absence or presence of UK personnel. In his [The MoD’s witness’] opinion were the locations to be released or inferred from a combination of requested data and already published material (the “mosaic effect”), there would be an elevated risk to any potential personnel in that location and an increased risk of hostile acts against them.”

A second concern was

“there would be an increased risk to any nation hosting the Reaper operations as an adversary may target a hostile act at the host nation rather than the UK which may be a more difficult target. Thereby undermining the UK’s relationship with that nation and undermining military operations conducted from that location.”

Finally, and most concerning from a scrutiny and oversight point of view the MoD argued (again quoting Decision Notice)

“The effectiveness of operations conducted using Reaper outside Operation Shader in future depend, in part, on a greater degree of ambiguity as to the employment of Reaper in order to be successful. It is important to retain a degree of ambiguity regarding the full extent of Reaper operations now in order to maintain this flexibility in the future. “

Drone Wars argued strongly that the information requested –  a single figure of the number of sorties undertaken outside of Operation Shader and their broad, geographic location (i.e. ‘The Middle East’) – was not capable of causing the prejudice alleged.  We also pointed out to the Tribunal that the MoD has previously released the number of sorties undertaken outside of Operation Shader (In response to our questions about the targeted killing of Naweed Hussain in 2018) without any of the prejudice or harm suggested, but that seems to have been ignored by the tribunal.  Read more

UK deployed Reaper drone to Sudan

Image of Port Sudan from UK Reaper video feed

The UK deployed an MQ-9 Reaper drone to Sudan as part of the military operation to support the evacuation of UK personnel the RAF has reported.

This is the first public acknowledgment of the deployment of UK Reaper drones outside of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.  Drone Wars UK has been fighting a long FoI battle with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) about a possible further unacknowledged deployment. The drone provided intelligence gathering and surveillance cover for UK military operations during the evacuation, but it is not known if it was armed during the operation.

In a brief 3 May 2023 press release, the Royal Air Force (RAF) stated

“The RAF’s Reaper, an uncrewed aircraft that is designed for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions has been supporting by providing up to date imagery of the port, airfield and ground environment. This includes highlighting unsafe and potentially dangerous areas to troops on the ground. It has also allowed for identification of buildings which would be suitable for temporary shelter, medical facilities, or locations to process passengers.

The Reaper was operated by XIII Squadron based at RAF Waddington. The Squadron Executive Officer said: “For XIII Squadron to operate the RAF Reaper over two separate continents on two different missions, having eyes on the ground in Africa and the Middle East simultaneously shows the flexibility of the aircraft and our people, a remarkable effort from all the Squadron”.”

The MoD reported that the military operation to safely evacuate UK personnel from Sudan had concluded on 3 May with the last flight departing from Port Sudan airport.  It reported that almost 2,500 personnel, including  1,200 non-UK nationals from 20 different countries had left via flight from  Wadi Saeedna airfield and Port Sudan airfield.  The UK Reaper drone had been tasked in particular with monitoring the UK’s processing station at Cora Hotel, Port Sudan where HMS Lancaster was based, as well as the two airfields from where evacuation flights too place.  Read more

Defence Secretary confirms UK drone targeted killing in Syria

At Defence Questions yesterday (13 March), the Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, confirmed suspicions that the UK strike in Syria in December 2022 was a British drone targeted killing.  Choosing his words carefully, Wallace told the House of Commons:

“I want to update the House on a strike that took place a few weeks ago, as is our agreement on strikes under Operation Shader. In late December, an RAF Reaper remotely piloted aircraft conducted a strike against a leading Daesh member in al-Bab, northern Syria. The individual’s activity was related to chemical and biological weapons. The Reaper’s crew minimised potential risk to civilians before firing two Hellfire missiles, both of which struck the target accurately. These actions are vital to degrading such terrorist threats, protecting British citizens and supporting our international partners.”

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had issued a short update two days after the strike:

“On Tuesday 20 December, a Reaper remotely piloted aircraft kept close observation on a building near Al Bab in northern Syria where at least one active Daesh terrorist was known to be present.  Great care was taken to ensure that any potential risks to civilians were understood and minimised before the Reaper’s crew fired a salvo of two Hellfire missiles which both struck the target accurately.”

Local sources reported at the time that two civilians – a woman and child – were injured in the strike and that one individual, a Yemeni national and ISIS commander was either severely injured or killed (see Airwars round-up of media reporting on the strike).  He was named locally by his nom de guerre of Abu Yasser al-Yemeni.

The local civilian civil defence force, know as the White Helmets, shared footage of the aftermath of the strike showing the house completely demolished.

Drone Wars submitted a Freedom of Information (FoI) request to the MoD in January asking if an investigation was underway into the reports of civilian casualties arising from the strike.  The MoD has refused to answer the request citing national security and international relations exemptions.  We have submitted an appeal.  Read more

MoD challenged at Information Tribunal on secret UK Reaper drone operations

Drone Wars appeared in court yesterday to appeal the refusal of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to give basic details of UK Reaper operations outside of its campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.  Judgement in the case is due to be given in around six weeks’ time.

In January 2020 the MoD refused to answer a Freedom of Information (FoI) request from Drone Wars UK seeking the number of UK Reaper flights that had taken place outside of Operation Shader during 2019 and their location. The request was refused both on national security and international relations grounds. Subsequently, Ministers refused to answer questions both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords about the sorties, claiming that Reaper was an ‘intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform’ and that Ministers “do not comment on intelligence matters.”

Labour MP Clive Lewis wrote directly to the Secretary of State, Ben Wallace, about the matter and was told in response:

“REAPER is not conducting strike operations outside those theatres for which Parliament has approved the deployment of UK Armed Forces. The vast majority of REAPER missions are reconnaissance and surveillance operations and as I am sure you can understand, to reveal where it is conducting those missions would provide valuable information to our adversaries.”

Clive Lewis and crossbench Peer, Baroness Viviane Stern, member of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones and Modern Conflict submitted written statements to the Tribunal urging the need for transparency. Mr Lewis argued that  the refusal to answer questions about the deployment of Reaper is “a serious backward step in terms of transparency and accountability.”

Baroness Stern stated:

“Despite repeated attempts by myself and colleagues to attain even the most basic information about the UK’s drone deployments, policy, and commitments, Parliament has not been provided with the accurate and timely information needed to meaningfully carry out its constitutional scrutiny role. Whilst certain details must be kept secret in order to ensure operational and national security, the current trend of withholding information about the use of drones purely because it is seen as an “intelligence” asset, as well as withholding vital information on the UK’s growing military capabilities and commitments is deeply concerning and unjustified.”

In court, the MoD argued against the release of the information on two grounds.  Firstly, that the information was exempt from release under Section 26 of the Freedom of Information Act, arguing that the information would prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of relevant forces.  Secondly, it argued that release of the information was exempt under Section 27 of the Act, in that its release would prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and any other State and/or the interests of the United Kingdom abroad.  Read more